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CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY JEAN GALBRAITH*
In this section:
• Department of Justice Declines to Defend the Constitutionality of a Statute
Criminalizing Female Genital Mutilation
• Secretary of State Describes Israeli Settlements in the West Bank as “Not Per Se
Inconsistent with International Law”
• U.S. Trade Representative Holds Environmental Consultations with South Korea
Regarding Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
• Congress Signals Concern About Human Rights Abuses in China
• Issuing Several Pardons, President Trump Intervenes in Proceedings of U.S. Troops
Charged or Convicted of Acts Amounting to War Crimes
• U.S. Drone Strike in Iraq Kills Iranian Military Leader Qasem Soleimani
• United States Creates the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Space Force to Strengthen
Military Capabilities in Space
* Karlos Bledsoe, Emily Friedman, David Ta-wei Huang, Emily Kyle, Beatrix Lu, Erica Rodarte, Rebecca
Wallace, and Howard Weiss contributed to the preparation of this section.
Copyright © 2020 by The American Society of International Law
288
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Department of Justice Declines to Defend the Constitutionality of a Statute Criminalizing Female
Genital Mutilation
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.16
On September 13, 2019, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal of United States
v. Nagarwala, a federal district court decision that had held unconstitutional the federal stat-
ute criminalizing the female genital mutilation (FGM) of minors. Jumana Nagarwala, an
emergency room doctor, was one of eight defendants charged by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for performing or assisting in performing FGM on nine girls, at least some
of whomwere around age seven.1 The federal district court judge inNagarwala rejected argu-
ments that Congress had the constitutional authority—under either its power to implement
treaty obligations or its power to regulate interstate commerce—to enact the statute at issue.
Although the DOJ appealed this decision, it changed its position while the case was on appeal
and declined to defend the constitutionality of the statute. The Sixth Circuit’s dismissal of the
appeal came at the request of the DOJ, which opposed an effort by the House of
Representatives to intervene in the case in defense of the statute’s constitutionality.
In 1996, Congress passed several measures aimed at combatting FGM.2 These measures
included: (1) the criminalization of the practice of FGM on girls under the age of 18; (2) a
directive to the Department of Health and Human Services to compile data on FGM and
engage in educational outreach efforts to relevant communities; (3) a directive to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide information to new immigrants on the
effects of FGM and on its criminalization; and (4) instructions to U.S. directors of interna-
tional financial institutions to oppose certain types of loans to countries that had yet to take
preventative measures against FGM.3 Nagarwala concerned the first of these provisions,
which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 116 (FGM Criminalization Statute).
1 United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613, 616 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (noting that four of the girls were
residents of Michigan, where the mutilation was performed, while five of the girls were brought from out of state);
Criminal Compl. at 5, United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D.Mich. 2018) (No. 2:17-cr-20274),
ECF No. 1.
2 During the time period when FGM legislation passed, there were an estimated 168,000 girls and women
living in the United States with or at risk for FGM or female circumcision. Wanda K. Jones, Jack Smith,
Burney Kieke, Jr. & Lynne Wilcox, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Female Genital Mutilation/
Female Circumcision, 112 PUB. HEALTH REPORTS 368, 369, 372 (Sept.–Oct. 1997), available at https://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1381943/pdf/pubhealthrep00038-0014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQS2-
GDSB]. A more recent study estimated the number to have increased to 513,000 by 2012. Howard Goldberg,
et al., Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the United States: Updated
Estimates of Women and Girls at Risk, 2012, 131 PUB. HEALTH REPORTS 1, 4, 7 (Mar.–Apr. 2016), available at
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Special%20Situations/fgmutilation.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7JBR-DYZB] (noting that over half of these persons had Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, or Nigeria as the
country of origin for themselves or their parents).
3 See Pub. L. 104-208, at § 645, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 116) (criminalizing FGM); id.,
§ 644 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1374) (directing the provision of information to new immigrants); id., § 579
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262k-2) (setting terms for financial loans); Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134, § 520(b), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (mandating the compilation
of data); see also Khadijah F. Sharif, Comment, Female Genital Mutilation: What Does the New Federal Law
Really Mean?, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 409, 418–20 (1997) (discussing the various provisions).
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The FGMCriminalization Statute provides that “whoever knowingly circumcises, excises,
or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another
person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 5 years, or both.”4 The statute exempts certain operations necessary for the
health of the minor (such as during childbirth), but makes clear that “no account shall be
taken” of any beliefs “that the operation is required as a matter of custom or ritual.”5 As find-
ings accompanying the statute, Congress observed that FGM “often results in the occurrence
of physical and psychological health effects that harm the women involved” and that “the
unique circumstances surrounding the practice of [FGM] place it beyond the ability of
any single State or local jurisdiction to control.”6 Congress also found that it had the authority
to criminalize FGM pursuant to specific provisions of the Constitution, pointing to its “affir-
mative power under section 8 of article I, the necessary and proper clause, section 5 of the
fourteenth Amendment, as well as under the treaty clause.”7
Since its enactment, the FGMCriminalization Statute had remainedmostly untested, as fede-
ral prosecutors apparently filed charges based on it only once before the charging of Nagarwala in
2017.8Nagarwala’s case eventually expanded to include seven co-defendants: another doctor, two
assistants, and four mothers who had arranged for the performance of FGM on their young
daughters.9 While most of the federal charges stemmed from the FGM Criminalization
Statute, Nagarwala was also charged with “conspiracy to travel with intent to engage in illicit sex-
ual conduct,” and four defendants were also charged with conspiring to tamper with witnesses.10
The defendants moved to dismiss the charges that were based on the FGM Criminalization
Statute on the ground that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to pass this statute.
In response, the DOJ defended the constitutionality of the FGM Criminalization Statute
on two separate bases. The first was that Congress had the constitutional authority to pass the
statute under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court
inMissouri v. Holland, gives Congress the power to implement treaties through legislation.11
4 18 U.S.C. § 116(a). Pursuant to a later amendment, the statute also criminalizes foreign travel for the purpose
of enabling FGM to be performed on a minor. See 18 U.S.C. § 116(d).
5 18 U.S.C. § 116(b)–(c).
6 Pub. L. 104-208, at § 645(a).
7 Id., § 645(a)(6). One of these grounds—the Fourteenth Amendment—was not raised in defense of the con-
stitutionality of the statute by the DOJ at the district court level. Instead, in response to Nagarwala’s motion to
dismiss, the DOJ relied only on Congress’s treaty-implementing power and commerce power. See generally
Response to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts One Through Five, United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d
613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 2:17-cr-20274), ECF No. 336 [hereinafter DOJ Response in the District
Court]. A footnote observed that “[t]he government defends the prosecution here on only the grounds enumerated
in this brief. It does not, however, waive the right to assert other grounds in future cases, should the facts and
circumstances so merit.” Id. at 15 n. 16.
8 Daniel Rice, Female Genital Mutilation and the Treaty Power: What Congress Can Do, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 29,
2019), at https://www.justsecurity.org/66757/female-genital-mutilation-and-the-treaty-power-what-congress-
can-do (observing that “federal prosecutors [had] brought only one set of charges under the FGM prohibition”
prior to the charging of Nagarwala and co-defendants in 2017). This number reflects only federal prosecutions.
Some U.S. states also criminalize FGM and, in addition, the perpetration of FGM could be criminally prosecuted
as child abuse or assault. See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
9 See 350 F. Supp. 3d at 615–16.
10 See id. at 616.
11 DOJ Response in the District Court, supra note 7, at 15–16; see alsoU.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
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The government argued that the FGMCriminalization Statute advances the objectives of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), including two of its specific
provisions.12 One of these was Article 3, under which the signatories “undertake to ensure the
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the
present Covenant.”13 The other was Article 24, which provides that “[e]very child shall have,
without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin,
property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.”14 In arguing that the FGM
Criminalization Statute was necessary and proper in light of these treaty provisions, the
DOJ emphasized that “the U.N. body tasked with overseeing implementation of the
ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee, has identified FGM as a gender-based impediment
to women and girls’ equal enjoyment of rights provided in the Covenant.”15 As its second,
separate defense of the statute’s constitutionality, the DOJ argued that Congress had the
authority to pass this statute as part of its power to regulate commerce.16
Judge Bernard Friedman of the Eastern District of Michigan rejected both of the DOJ’s
arguments. He held that “Congress had no authority to pass this statute under either the
Necessary and Proper Clause or the Commerce Clause.”17
On the first issue, the district court concluded that “there is no [rational] relationship
between the ICCPR and the FGM [Criminalization Statute]” and therefore that Congress’s
treaty-implementing power did not provide Congress with authority to pass the statute.18
The court’s analysis focused exclusively on the text of the ICCPR, without addressing
how it had been interpreted and applied by the Human Rights Committee.19 The court
stated:
[T]here is no rational relationship between the FGM [Criminalization Statute] and Article
3 [of the ICCPR] . . . . This article seeks to ensure equal civil and political rights (e.g., the
freedom of expression, the right to participate in elections, and protections for defendants
in criminal proceedings) for men and women, while the FGM Criminalization Statute
seeks to protect girls aged seventeen and younger from a particular form of physical
abuse. There is simply no rational relationship between Article 3 and the FGM statute.
The latter does not effectuate the purposes of the former in any way.
12 DOJ Response in the District Court, supra note 7, at 18–21 (noting that the Senate advised and consented to
the ICCPR in 1992). The DOJ did not rely on Article 7 of the ICCPR, which prohibits cruel or degrading treat-
ment, as the United States had entered a reservation limiting the scope of that article. See id. at 19 n. 18.
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 3, Oct. 5, 1977, 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; see also DOJ Response in the District Court, supra note 7, at 19.
14 ICCPR, supra note 13, Art. 24; see also DOJ Response in the District Court, supra note 7, at 19.
15 DOJ Response in the District Court, supra note 7, at 19–20; see also id. at 27–28 (once again discussing the
Human Rights Committee’s treatment of FGM). General Comment 28 of the Human Rights Committee, for
example, calls upon state parties to provide the Committee with information regarding “the practice of genital
mutilation,” including “on measures to eliminate it.” Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment
28: Article 3 (Equality of Rights Between Men and Women), at 3, UN Doc. No. CCPR/C/21/rev.1/Add.10
(Mar. 29, 2000).
16 DOJ Response in the District Court, supra note 7, at 29–44; see also U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17 350 F. Supp. 3d at 630. For a critique of the court’s reasoning, see Rice, supra note 8.
18 350 F. Supp. 3d at 630.
19 See id. at 617–18.
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The relationship between the FGM [Criminalization Statute] and Article 24 is arguably
closer . . . [but still] tenuous. Article 24 is an anti-discrimination provision, which calls for
the protection of minors without regard to their race, color, sex, or other characteristics. As
laudable as the prohibition of a particular type of abuse of girls may be, it does not logically
further the goal of protecting children on a nondiscriminatory basis.20
As an alternative holding, the district court stated that “even assuming the treaty and the
FGM [Criminalization Statute] are rationally related, federalism concerns deprive Congress
of the power to enact this statute.”21 The court observed that, in advising and consenting to
the ICCPR, the Senate had included an understanding indicating that federalism principles
were relevant to the implementation of the ICCPR.22 The court quoted at length from the
Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Bond v. United States, which drew upon federalism princi-
ples in narrowly interpreting a criminal statute implementing the Chemical Weapons
Convention.23 Aftermaking these two references, the court concluded that “[l]ike the common
law assault at issue in Bond, FGM is local criminal activity which, in keeping with longstanding
tradition and our federal system of government, is for the states to regulate, not Congress.”24
The district court separately held that Congress did not have the power under the Commerce
Clause to enact the FGMCriminalization Statute.25 The court determined that FGMcould not
be deemed an economic or commercial activity, concluding that the DOJ had failed to show an
interstate market beyond the facts of the present case and that FGM could not be regulated as
health care, notwithstanding its performance by medical professionals, because it “is a form of
physical assault, not anything approaching a healthcare service.”26 The court also noted the
absence of a jurisdictional element in the statute requiring that the victims or providers of
FGM “traveled in, or had any effect on, interstate commerce.”27
The DOJ appealed the district court decision to the Sixth Circuit.28 But on April 10, 2019,
after receiving two extensions to file an opening brief on appeal, the DOJ reversed its stance in
identical letters from the solicitor general to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.29
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. This understanding provided that the ICCPR “shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the
extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the
state and local governments” and that “to the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such
matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the com-
petent authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the”
ICCPR. 138 CONG. REC. S4834 (Apr. 2, 1992).
23 350 F. Supp. 3d at 619–20; see also Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 847–49 (2014) (concluding as a
matter of statutory interpretation that the federal statute implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention did
not criminalize a woman’s attempt to poison her husband’s lover).
24 350 F. Supp. 3d at 620 (quotation marks omitted).
25 Id. at 627–30.
26 Id. at 628.
27 Id. at 629.
28 See Notice of Appeal, at 1–2, United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No.
2:17-cr-20274), ECF No. 378.
29 Letter from Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, to Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, at 2 (Apr. 10, 2019), at https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/osg-530d-letters/
4_10_2019/download [https://perma.cc/4FU6-EQ2E]; Letter from Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, to
Jerrold Nadler, Chairman Member of the House Committee on the Judiciary, at 1–2 (Apr. 10, 2019), available
at https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2019/04/530D-Letter-FGM-Statute.pdf
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The letters, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 530D (530D Letters),30 acted as official notice to
Congress that the DOJ would not defend the constitutionality of the FGM Criminalization
Statute on appeal. The solicitor general stated that while FGM performed on minors is “an
especially heinous practice . . . that should be universally condemned,” the DOJ had “reluc-
tantly determined that . . . it lacks a reasonable defense of the [FGMCriminalization Statute],
as currently worded.”31 In the solicitor general’s view, the FGMCriminalization Statute could
not be defended as an exercise of Congress’s treaty-implementing power and, as written, lacked
the nexus to commerce necessary for it to be defensible as an exercise of Congress’s commerce
power. The solicitor general suggested that Congress could cure the constitutional issue with
respect to the Commerce Clause by amending the FGM Criminalization Statute to include a
nexus to interstate or foreign commerce as an element of the crime.32
The solicitor general offered the following explanation for why the DOJ would not defend
the FGM Criminalization Statute as an exercise of Congress’s treaty-implementing power:
[T]he [DOJ] has determined that it does not have an adequate argument that Section
116(a) is within Congress’s authority to enact legislation to implement the ICCPR,
which does not address FGM. None of the ICCPR’s provisions reference FGM at all.
Nor do they provide a basis for the federal government itself (rather than the individual
States) to criminalize FGM of minors by private parties. This case is therefore not anal-
ogous to Holland, which involved a treaty that more directly addressed the parties’ obli-
gation to protect certain migratory birds and to propose legislation to do so. Thus, even
maintaining the full continuing validity of Holland, the [DOJ] does not believe it can
defend Section 116(a) on this ground.33
On April 30, 2019, the House of Representatives filed a motion to intervene in the
Nagarwala appeal in order to defend the constitutionality of the FGM Criminalization
Statute.34 In an accompanying press release, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi explained
that the “Trump Administration’s sudden refusal to advance legal arguments to defend a
long-standing federal statute criminalizing this horrific act disrespects the health and futures
of vulnerable women and girls.”35 In its motion, the House observed that 28 U.S.C. §
530D(b)(2) requires the DOJ to notify Congress of a decision not to defend the
[https://perma.cc/6ZJP-FXPZ] [collectively hereinafter 530D Letters]; see also Mot. of the U.S. House of
Representatives to Intervene, at 6, United States v. Nagarwala (6th Cir. filed Apr. 30, 2019) (No. 19-1015),
ECF No. 24 [hereinafter Motion to Intervene] (noting the two extensions sought by the DOJ).
30 This statute provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in
which the Attorney General or any officer of theDepartment of Justice . . . determines . . . to refrain (on the ground
that the provision is unconstitutional) from defending or asserting, in any judicial, administrative, or other pro-
ceeding, the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal statute.” 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii).
31 530D Letters, supra note 29, at 1–2.
32 Id. at 2. The solicitor general did not discuss whether, in his view, Congress would have the constitutional
authority to enact the FGMCriminalization Statute if the United States were to ratify other human rights treaties,
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination AgainstWomen or the Convention on
the Rights of the Child. See generally id.
33 Id. (citation omitted).
34 Motion to Intervene, supra note 29.
35 Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House Press Release, Pelosi Statement on Filing of House Intervention to
Uphold Federal Statute Criminalizing Female Genital Mutilation (May 1, 2019), at https://www.speaker.gov/
newsroom/5119-3 [https://perma.cc/HY2K-UDCG].
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constitutionality of a statute “‘within such time as will reasonably enable the House of
Representatives and the Senate to take action, separately or jointly, to intervene in timely fash-
ion in the proceeding.’”36 The House pointed to several prior instances in which it had inter-
vened in civil proceedings to defend a statute’s constitutionality and argued that the same
standard should be applicable to appeals in criminal cases.37 The House reasoned that its
intervention would “ensur[e] that the FGM [Criminalization Statute] receives a vigorous con-
stitutional defense” since the “Executive Branch and defendants agree—incorrectly—that the
FGM [Criminalization Statute] is unconstitutional.”38
In response, the DOJ both opposed the House’s intervention and moved to voluntarily
dismiss the appeal.39 The DOJ argued that the House had no authority to intervene in crim-
inal proceedings, stating that “the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute dis-
cretion to decide whether to prosecute a case” and “[n]o court has ever permitted the
Legislature to . . . extend a federal criminal prosecution that the United States has determined
no longer to pursue on appeal.”40 The DOJ argued that the “proper role of the House in
ensuring the viability of future prosecutions for [FGM] is its participation in the bicameralism
and presentment process for enacting new laws.”41
On September 13, 2019, the Sixth Circuit granted the DOJ’s motion to voluntarily dis-
miss the appeal.42 The court did not address the House’s motion to intervene. Instead, it
simply granted the motion to voluntarily dismiss the case, thus making the House’s pending
motion moot.43 The court noted that it “generally grant[s] motions to voluntarily dismiss
unless it would be unjust or unfair to do so” and found “no reason to disregard our general
rule” after “[h]aving considered the parties’ arguments.”44
On the same day that the Sixth Circuit dismissed Nagarwala, the D.C. Circuit upheld a
different congressional statute as a valid exercise of Congress’s treaty-implementing power.45
United States v. Park concerned the constitutionality of a federal statute that criminalized the
sexual abuse of children by U.S. citizens abroad.46 Reversing the federal district court, the
D.C. Circuit held that Congress had the authority to enact this statute in order to implement
the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography,
which the United States had ratified in 2002.47 While the court acknowledged that the
36 Motion to Intervene, supra note 29, at 6 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 530D(b)(2)).
37 Id. at 8–9.
38 Id. at 13–14.
39 Opposition of the United States to Motion of the U.S. House of Representatives to Intervene, United States
v. Nagarwala (6th Cir. filed May 31, 2019) (No. 19-1015), ECF No. 41 [hereinafter Opposition to Motion to
Intervene]; Mot. to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal, United States v. Nagarwala (6th Cir. filed May 31, 2019) (No.
19-1015), ECF. No. 40.
40 Opposition to Motion to Intervene, supra note 39, at 5.
41 Id.
42 United States v. Nagarwala, No. 19-1015, 2019 WL 7425389, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 13, 2019).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 United States v. Park, 938 F.3d 354, 363–64 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
46 Id. at 357–58 (considering the constitutionality of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act, as codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2423). The DOJ “argue[d] on appeal that
Congress’s treaty [implementing] power and the Foreign Commerce Clause support[ed]” the constitutionality
of the statute as applied to the criminal prosecution at issue in the case. Id. at 362.
47 Id. at 357, 360.
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Optional Protocol only required the criminalization of child prostitution “‘for remuneration
or any other form of consideration,’” the court concluded that “the Optional Protocol’s goal
of eliminating commercial child sexual exploitation, including global sex tourism, could be
undercut if Congress failed to criminalize non-commercial child sex abuse by U.S. residents
abroad.”48 As one of its reasons, the court noted that while the “government may not simply
point to any tangentially related treaty to defend a constitutionally suspect statute,” neverthe-
less Congress’s “power to give the treaty practical effect . . . is not confined to the Optional
Protocol’s minimum requirements.”49 The D.C. Circuit’s decision is one of several federal
appellate decisions in recent years upholding the constitutionality of an exercise of Congress’s
treaty-implementing power.50
The statutes at issue in both Nagarwala and Park reflect a congressional commitment to
deterring and punishing abuses committed against children. In the wake of the DOJ’s deci-
sion not to defend the FGM Criminalization Statute, the House passed an unopposed non-
binding resolution denouncing the practice of FGM and calling on the international
community and the Department of State and United States Agency for International
Development to accelerate efforts to eliminate it.51 Members of Congress have also intro-
duced various bills to fund efforts to combat FGM and to amend the FGM
Criminalization Statute so that it includes a more explicit nexus to commerce.52
The district court decision inNagarwala and the DOJ’s subsequent decision not to defend
the statute may animate efforts for more state law protection against FGM.53 Roughly half of
the states currently have laws specifically criminalizing FGM, at least with respect to minors,
and the perpetration of FGM could also fall within the elements of more broadly phrased
48 Id. at 368. The court separately held that Congress had the authority to criminalize the production of child por-
nography in order to implement theOptional Protocol, concluding that the statute’s “criminalization of non-commer-
cial child pornography production plainly implements the treaty and is constitutional” because “theOptional Protocol,
by its terms, reaches both commercial and non-commercial production of child pornography.” Id. at 366.
49 Id. at 369.
50 SeeUnited States v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2018) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Hostage Taking Act as implementing the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages); United States
v. Noel, 893 F.3d 1294, 1305 (11th Cir. 2018) (same); see alsoUnited States v. Ryan, _ F. Supp. 3d. __, 2019WL
7556053, at *14 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 20, 2019) (finding that Congress had the constitutional authority to criminalize
the possession of polonium-210 in order to implement the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism).
51 H.R. Res. 106, 116th Cong. (2019), at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/106.
52 H.R. 3583, 116th Cong. (2019), at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3583 (propos-
ing that the FGM Criminalization Statute be amended as suggested in the 530D Letters); S. 2017, 116th Cong.
(2019), at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2017?s¼1&r¼5 (same); H.R. 960, 116th
Cong. (2019), at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/960 (proposing increased grants to
aid FGM victims and calling for data collection on FGM criminal occurrences); H.R. 959, 116th Congress
(2019), at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/959/text (proposing the criminalization of
FGM when individuals transport minors across state lines); H.Amdt.341 to H.R. 2740, Labor, Health and
Human Services, Education, Defense, State, Foreign Operations, and Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act, 2020, 116th Cong. (2019), at https://www.congress.gov/amendment/116th-congress/
house-amendment/341?s¼a&r¼46 (proposing funding for combatting FGM).
53 E.g., HollieMcKay,Minnesota Lawmaker’s Push for Tougher Female Genital Mutilation Law Faces Opposition,
FOX NEWS (Feb. 19, 2019) at https://www.foxnews.com/politics/the-push-to-prosecute-parents-for-fgm-in-min-
nesota-proves-a-struggle-for-republican-lawmaker (noting a push for stronger FGM state statutes in Minnesota,
where some of theNagarwala victims resided); see also Shellie Sylvestri, Female GenitalMutilation Bill Introduced in
KY, WAVE 3 NEWS (Jan. 13, 2020), at https://www.wave3.com/2020/01/14/female-genital-mutilation-bill-intro-
duced-ky (noting the introduction of a bill in the Kentucky legislature).
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crimes.54 There is considerable variation among these state laws, including whether they
criminalize travel outside the state for the performance of FGM and what sentences they
impose for FGM.55 Unless Congress amends the FGM Criminalization Statute or the
DOJ reverses its position that the statute is unconstitutional, there is no federal alternative
to these state laws for the prosecution of FGM as a crime. But other federal criminal laws may
be brought to bear against the perpetrators of FGM. In the Eastern District of Michigan, the
DOJ continues to pursue charges against Jumana Nagarwala for the crime of conspiracy to
travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct.56
Secretary of State Describes Israeli Settlements in the West Bank as “Not Per Se Inconsistent with
International Law”
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.14
OnNovember 18, 2019, Secretary of StateMike Pompeo stated that the “establishment of
Israeli civilian settlements in theWest Bank is not per se inconsistent with international law.”1
This announcement contrasts with the approach taken by the State Department late in the
Obama administration. Although embraced by Israel, the position announced by Pompeo
was criticized by Palestinians, Security Council members and other states, who maintain
that Israeli settlements in the West Bank violate international law. In January of 2020, the
Trump administration released its proposed peace plan for the Israelis and Palestinians,
which met with approval from Israeli leaders and rejection from Palestinian leaders.
Israeli citizens began moving to theWest Bank after Israel captured the territory in the Six-
DayWar in 1967, and U.S. perspectives about the legality of the settlements have varied over
the course of different administrations. The Carter administration declared the settlements to
be illegal in a State Department letter, concluding that “[w]hile Israel may undertake, in the
occupied territories, actions necessary to meet its military needs and to provide for orderly
government during the occupation . . . the civilian settlements in those territories is inconsis-
tent with international law.”2 In 1981, President Reagan told reporters that he disagreed with
his predecessor’s position and did not consider the settlements to be illegal.3 President
54 See Limor Ezioni, Contemporary Aspects of Female Genital Mutilation Prohibitions in the United States, 28
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 39, 49–61 (2019) (surveying state laws); see also id. at 61 (concluding that
“about half of the states have not enacted an anti-FGM bill”).
55 See id. at 49–61 (discussing the variation in state laws).
56 See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b); Gov.’s Response to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Count Seven (R.373), United States
v. Nagarwala (E.D. Mich filed January 31, 2020) (No. 17-20274), ECF. No. 422.
1 U.S. State Dep’t Press Release, SecretaryMichael R. Pompeo Remarks to the Press (Nov. 18, 2019), at https://
www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press [https://perma.cc/5L3G-GMER] [hereinafter
Pompeo Remarks].
2 Letter from State Department Legal Adviser Concerning Legality of Israeli Settlements in the Occupied
Territories, Apr. 21, 1978, 17 ILM 777.
3 Excerpts from Interview with President Reagan Conducted by Five Reporters, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 1981), at
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/03/world/excerpts-from-interview-with-president-reagan-conducted-by-
five-reporters.html.
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George H.W. Bush called the settlements “counterproductive to peace,”4 but his administra-
tion did not describe them as illegal.5 The Clinton and GeorgeW. Bush administrations raised
various criticisms related to settlements, but did not expressly declare them to be illegal.6
In a 2009 speech, President Obama stated that the “United States does not accept the legit-
imacy of continued Israeli settlements”without speaking directly to their legality.7 At the end
of his administration, however, the United States declined to veto Security Council
Resolution 2334, which “[r]eaffirms that the establishment by Israel of settlements in the
Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 . . . has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant
violation under international law . . . . ”8 In remarks explaining the decision to abstain,
Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the settlements, in combination with other actions,
“destroy hopes for peace on both sides and increasingly cement[] an irreversible one-state real-
ity.”9 He observed that in “1978, the State Department Legal Adviser advised the Congress
on his conclusion that Israel’s government, the Israeli Government’s program of establishing
civilian settlements in the occupied territory is inconsistent with international law, and we see
no change since then to affect that fundamental conclusion.”10
Since taking office in 2017, President Trump has made other changes to previous admin-
istrations’ policies relating to Israel. In December 2017, Trump recognized Jerusalem as
Israel’s capital and moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem a few months later.11 In response,
Palestine initiated a lawsuit in the International Court of Justice arguing that the relocation of
the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem violates the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.12
Then, in March 2019, the Trump administration recognized Israeli sovereignty over
the Golan Heights, another disputed territory that Israel captured during the Six-Day
4 President George H.W. Bush, Remarks at a St. Patrick’s Day Ceremony and an Exchange with Reporters, 1
PUB. PAPERS 467 (March 17, 1992).
5 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT DOCUMENTS 1991, at 570 (Paul Claussen & Evan M. Duncan eds.,
1994) (Secretary of State James Baker: “The settlement activity is something that the United States has opposed
for a long time. Our particular opposition today to settlement activity is that it constitutes an obstacle to peace. In
the past, the position of the United States has been that it was, in fact, illegal.” Q: “But that’s not this adminis-
tration?” Secretary Baker: “That is not our policy, No.”).
6 See President William J. Clinton, News Conference with European Union Leaders of Dec. 16, 1996, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 2520 (Dec. 23, 1996) (responding “absolutely” when asked if the settlements
were an “obstacle to peace”); President George W. Bush, Interview with Nahum Barnea and Shimon Shiffer of
Yedioth Ahronoth of Jan. 2, 2008, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 5 (Jan. 14, 2008) (distinguishing between
“authorized” and “unauthorized” settlements and expressing the expectation that Israel would “get rid of unau-
thorized settlements”).
7 White House Press Release, Remarks by President Obama at Cairo University (June 4, 2009), at https://oba-
mawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09 [https://perma.cc/
8CUX-ZDW2].
8 SC Res. 2334, para. 1 (Dec. 23, 2016).
9 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, John Kerry, Remarks on Middle East Peace (Dec. 28, 2016), at https://
2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/266119.htm [https://perma.cc/JVX6-FSDY].
10 Id.; see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 111
AJIL 477 (2017) (providing further discussion of the U.S. abstention).
11 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 306, 307 (2018).
12 ICJ Press Release, The State of Palestine Institutes Proceedings Against the United States of America (Sept.
28, 2018), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/176/176-20180928-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AM2C-438L]. Palestine claims that the Vienna Convention requires embassies to be located in the ter-
ritory of the host state, and disputes that Jerusalem is part of Israel’s territory. Id. The case remains pending.
Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. United States of America): Latest Developments,
INT’L CT. OF JUST., at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/176.
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War.13 Pompeo said that the U.S. decision does not set a precedent allowing territory to be
taken from another country by force, describing the occupation of the Golan Heights as a
“unique situation” because “the Israelis ended up with the Golan Heights as the result of hav-
ing been attacked. . . . They were at risk of their very nation being overrun . . . and they
defended themselves, and they retained that terrain to continue to defend themselves from
the murderous regimes in Syria.”14
At a press conference on November 18, 2019, Pompeo stated that “the Trump adminis-
tration is reversing the Obama administration approach towards Israeli settlements.”15 He
elaborated:
The establishment of Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank is not per se inconsis-
tent with international law.
I want to emphasize several important considerations.
First, look, we recognize that—as Israeli courts have—the legal conclusions relating to
individual settlements must depend on an assessment of specific facts and circumstances
on the ground. Therefore, the United States Government is expressing no view on the
legal status of any individual settlement.
The Israeli legal system affords an opportunity to challenge settlement activity and assess
humanitarian considerations connected to it. Israeli courts have confirmed the legality of
certain settlement activities and has concluded that others cannot be legally sustained.
Second, we are not addressing or prejudging the ultimate status of theWest Bank. This is
for the Israelis and the Palestinians to negotiate. International law does not compel a par-
ticular outcome, nor create any legal obstacle to a negotiated resolution.
Third, the conclusion that we will no longer recognize Israeli settlements as per se incon-
sistent with international law is based on the unique facts, history, and circumstances
presented by the establishment of civilian settlements in the West Bank. Our decision
today does not prejudice or decide legal conclusions regarding situations in any other
parts of the world.
And finally—finally—calling the establishment of civilian settlements inconsistent with
international law hasn’t worked. It hasn’t advanced the cause of peace.
The hard truth is there will never be a judicial resolution to the conflict, and arguments
about who is right and wrong as a matter of international law will not bring peace. This is
a complex political problem that can only be solved by negotiations between the Israelis
and the Palestinians.16
13 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 613, 613 (2019).
14 State Department Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, C-SPAN, at 49:00–51:00 (Apr. 9, 2019), at https://www.
c-span.org/video/?459622-1/secretary-state-pompeo-testifies-fiscal-year-2020-budget-request&start¼2953; see
Galbraith, supra note 13, at 617.
15 Pompeo Remarks, supra note 1.
16 Id.
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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu celebrated this announcement, saying that it
“reflects an historical truth—that the Jewish people are not foreign colonialists in Judea and
Samaria.”17 Palestinian leaders, in contrast, were angered. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat
criticized the Trump administration for “threatening the international systemwith its unceas-
ing attempts to replace international law with the ‘law of the jungle.’”18 Palestinians in the
West Bank responded to the announcement with a “day of rage,” protesting throughout the
West Bank.19
In his remarks, Pompeo did not explain the U.S. reasoning with respect to international
law. The Fourth Geneva Convention (Convention) applies to “all cases of declared war or of
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them” and “all cases of partial
or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance.”20 Article 49 of the Convention provides that “[t]he
Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies.”21 The widely prevailing view is that—either directly, as reflective of
customary international law, or both—the Convention applies to the occupation of the
West Bank, and that Israeli settlements violate the Convention’s prohibition on civilian pop-
ulation transfers.22
Many nations responded to Pompeo’s announcement by reaffirming concerns about Israeli
activity in the West Bank or by reiterating the conclusion that all Israeli settlements in the
West Bank are illegal. On the day after Pompeo’s announcement, the Third Committee of
the General Assembly advanced a resolution on “The right of the Palestinian people to self-
17 Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, Statement from the PrimeMinister’s Office (Nov. 18, 2019), at
https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2019/Pages/Statement-from-the-Prime-Minister-s-Office-18-November-
2019.aspx. At the time the announcement was made, Netanyahu was facing a close election, and the U.S.
announcement was seen as politically beneficial to him. Lara Jakes & David M. Halbfinger, In Shift, U.S. Says
Israeli Settlements in West Bank Do Not Violate International Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019), at https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/world/middleeast/trump-israel-west-bank-settlements.html. Pompeo denied
that the timing of the announcement was connected to politics. Pompeo Remarks, supra note 1.
18 State of Palestine Negotiations Affairs Dep’t. Press Release, Dr. Saeb Erekat on Mike Pompeo Statement on
Israeli Settlements (Nov. 18, 2019), at https://www.nad.ps/en/media-room/press-releases/dr-saeb-erekat-mike-
pompeo-statement-israeli-settlements [https://perma.cc/57RB-PXVS].
19 Mohammed Daraghmeh, Palestinians Protest Settlement Decision in “Day of Rage,” ASSOC. PRESS (Nov. 26,
2019), at https://apnews.com/f2049665002045869da66b237c3673c1.
20 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
UST 3316.
21 Id. Art. 49.
22 Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AJIL 44, 69
(1990) (observing that this understanding “has been very widely held internationally” and that “a remarkable
degree of unanimity prevails on this matter”). The International Court of Justice, the General Assembly, and
the Security Council have all supported this conclusion. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Rep. 136, (July 9), at https://unispal.
un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/B59ECB7F4C73BDBC85256EEB004F6D20; GA Res. 70/89, para. 2 (Dec. 15,
2015); SC Res. 2334, supra note 8; SC Res. 465, para. 5 (Mar. 1, 1980). For a recent description of arguments
made by Israel and some others to the contrary, see generally Theodor Meron, The West Bank and International
Humanitarian Law on the Eve of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Six-DayWar, 111 AJIL 357 (2017) (describing these
arguments while concluding that, consistent with a position the author took in 1967 as the legal adviser to the
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the West Bank settlements violate the Fourth Geneva Convention).
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determination,” which calls for “an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967,” by a
vote of 164 to five with nine abstentions.23 The votes in favor included Canada, which had
voted “no” or abstained on similar resolutions for the past fourteen years.24 At a Security
Council meeting two days after Pompeo’s statement, most members of the Security
Council called the settlements illegal and many criticized the United States for issuing a uni-
lateral declaration of international law that contravenes the UN’s position.25 UN Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov called Israeli settlements
“a flagrant violation of international law” and an obstacle to a peaceful solution at the meet-
ing.26 The United Kingdom issued a statement reiterating its position that the settlements are
illegal and urging Israel to “halt its counterproductive settlement expansion.”27 In December
2019, Fatou Bensouda, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, stated, in sub-
mitting a request for a jurisdictional ruling to the Court, that “Palestine’s viability as a State
(and the exercise of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination) has been obstructed
by the expansion of settlements and the construction of the barrier and its associated regime in
the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in violation of international law.”28
The Trump administration’s West Bank policy gained renewed international attention in
late January of 2020, when Trump announced his Middle East peace plan. On the issue of
West Bank settlements, the plan would “incorporate the vast majority of Israeli settlements
into contiguous Israeli territory,” while calling on Israel to refrain during negotiations from
building any new settlements or expanding existing settlements outside of the territory pro-
posed for incorporation.29 The plan endorses a two-state solution, but makes the recognition
of a Palestinian state contingent on Palestinian leaders “recognizing Israel as the Jewish state,
rejecting terrorism in all its forms, allowing for special arrangements that address Israel’s and
the region’s vital security needs, building effective institutions and choosing pragmatic solu-
tions.”30 The capital of the Palestinian state would be East Jerusalem, while Jerusalem would
be the undivided capital of Israel.31
23 UNGA, Social, Humanitarian&Cultural Issues (Third Committee): Status of Action onDraft Proposals, at
https://www.un.org/en/ga/third/74/proposalstatus.shtml. The resolution passed in the General Assembly a
month later. GA Res. 74/139 (Dec. 18, 2019), at https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/139.
24 EvanDyer,Canada Reverses UN Stance on Palestinians in Break with U.S. Over Settlements, CBCNEWS (Nov.
19, 2019), at https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/un-palestinian-vote-canada-israel-us-1.5365637.
25 UN Meetings Coverage, Israeli-Palestinian Escalation in Gaza Shows Urgent Need for Political Process on
Middle East Peace Process, Special Coordinator Tells Security Council (Nov. 20, 2019), at https://www.un.org/
press/en/2019/sc14026.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/FV73-7Y39].
26 Israeli Settlements Remain “Flagrant Violation” of International Law, UN Envoy Tells Security Council, UN
NEWS (Nov. 20, 2019), at https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1051781.
27 UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office Press Release, Israeli Settlements: November 2019: UK Statement
(Nov. 21, 2019), at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/israeli-settlements-uk-statement [https://perma.cc/
7Y8R-9RSK].
28 Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in the State of Palestine, ICC-01/18, para. 146 (Jan. 22, 2020).
29 White House Press Release, Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli
People (January 2020), at 12, 38 available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Peace-
to-Prosperity-0120.pdf.
30 Id. at 4.
31 Id. at 17.
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Netanyahu praised the plan as “a great plan for Israel” and “a great plan for peace.”32
Meanwhile, Palestinian leaders rejected the plan as “nonsense.”33 Erekat said that the plan
“specifies the elements of apartheid,”34 and Palestinian President Abbas said “[w]e say
1,000 no’s” to the proposal.35 Some other countries in the region, including the United
Arab Emirates,36 Saudi Arabia,37 and Egypt38 expressed appreciation for Trump’s efforts
to develop a comprehensive peace plan and expressed hope that it would launch negotiations
between Israel and Palestine. UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab also called the plan “a seri-
ous proposal, reflecting extensive time and effort,” but noted that “[o]nly the leaders of Israel
and the Palestinian territories can determine whether these proposals can meet the needs and
aspirations of the people they represent.”39 Other countries strongly criticized the plan.
Turkey described the plan as “an annexation plan aiming to destroy the two-state solution
and seize the Palestinian territories” and said that “[t]here will be not be any peace in the
Middle East without ending Israel’s occupation policies.”40 German Foreign Minister
Heiko Maas expressed concern about the plan’s compliance with international law, saying
that it raises questions concerning “how the proposal related to internationally agreed param-
eters and legal positions.”41
32 White House Press Release, Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu of the State of
Israel in Joint Statements (Jan. 28, 2020), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presi-
dent-trump-prime-minister-netanyahu-state-israel-joint-statements [https://perma.cc/7XGK-GY8J]. After
Trump stated during the unveiling of his peace plan that “the United States will recognize sovereignty over the
territory that my vision provides to be part of the State of Israel,” id., Netanyahu announced that Israel would
annex parts of the West Bank. David M. Halbfinger & Isabel Kershner, Trump Plan’s First Result: Israel Will
Claim Sovereignty Over Part of West Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020), at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/
28/world/middleeast/israel-west-bank-annex-sovereignty.html. The Trump administration then reportedly
asked Netanyahu to postpone the annexation. Isabel Kershner, Israel Puts Brakes on West Bank Annexation
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2020), at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/02/world/middleeast/israel-west-bank-
annexation.html.
33 Aron Heller &Matthew Lee, Trump Peace Plan Delights Israelis, Enrages Palestinians, ASSOC. PRESS (Jan. 28,
2020), at https://apnews.com/f7d36b9023309ce4b1e423b02abf52c6.
34 Mark Stone, Trump’s Peace Plan Has “Elements of Apartheid,” Palestinian Official Says, SKY NEWS (Jan. 28,
2020), at https://news.sky.com/story/trumps-peace-plan-has-elements-of-apartheid-palestinian-official-says-
11920958.
35 Heller & Lee, supra note 33.
36 UAE Press Release, Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba Statement on Peace Plan (Jan. 28, 2020), at https://www.
uae-embassy.org/news-media/ambassador-yousef-al-otaiba-statement-peace-plan [https://perma.cc/FJ28-PNYN].
37 Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jan. 28, 2020), at https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang¼en&
newsid¼2027848#2027848 [https://perma.cc/6DHG-XSMB].
38 EgyptMinistry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, Press Statement (Jan. 28, 2020), at https://www.mfa.gov.eg/
English/MediaCenter/News/Pages/You-are-making.aspx [https://perma.cc/M6L8-GJFQ].
39 UK Foreign &Commonwealth Office Press Release, Release of US Proposals for Middle East Peace: Foreign
Secretary’s Statement (Jan. 28, 2020), at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-
release-of-us-proposals-for-middle-east-peace [https://perma.cc/P45A-7TAD].
40 Turk. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, Press Release Regarding the Plan Released by US
Administration on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Jan. 28, 2020), at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_28_-abd-nin-
israil-filistin-ihtilafina-yonelik-yayimladigi-plan-hk.en.mfa [https://perma.cc/J37Q-2747].
41 Ger. Federal Foreign Office Press Release, Foreign Minister Maas on US Proposal for Middle East Peace
Process (Jan. 28, 2020), at https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2296906 [https://perma.cc/
GQ7G-BKHX].
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INTERNATIONAL OCEANS, ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND AVIATION LAW
U.S. Trade Representative Holds Environmental Consultations with South Korea Regarding
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.18
The United States requested environmental consultations with South Korea under the
United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) in September 2019. This request
occurred on the same day as the release of a report to Congress raising concerns about
South Korea’s response to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Following the consul-
tations, South Korea amended its law regulating the Korean fisheries industry in order to
make more enforcement mechanisms available.
On September 19, 2019, the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service released its biennial
report to Congress on fisheries management, which identified South Korea and two other
nations as failing to adequately regulate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.1 The
report noted that the treaty monitoring body for the Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources had determined that, in 2017, two South Korean fishing
vessels had impermissibly set “longline gear within 24 hours of a notified fishery closure.”2
South Korea had ordered the boats to leave and suspended one boat’s license for two months,
but it did not impose fines or seize the illegal catch.3 This was because its Distant Water
Fisheries Development Act provided only for criminal penalties, which it chose not to pursue
in response to the 2017 incident.4 The 2019 report to Congress noted that during prior con-
sultations with both the treaty monitoring body and U.S. negotiators, South Korea had “rec-
ognized the need for administrative enforcement authority to address cases . . . that are
inappropriate for criminal prosecution, as well as for enabling the government to deprive
the violators of the economic benefit of their violations.”5 South Korea represented that it
would soon be amending its Distant Water Fisheries Development Act to incorporate
such changes.6
Although the 2019 report recognized that South Korea was already on its way to reforming
its laws, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) requested consultations with
South Korea on this subject on the same day that the report was released.7 TheUSTR invoked
1 Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Improving International Fisheries Management: 2019 Report to
Congress 27–30 (2019), at https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/foreign/international-affairs/identification-iuu-fish-
ing-activities [https://perma.cc/RTN5-LQEM] [hereinafter 2019 NOAA Report] (also identifying Ecuador
and Mexico); see also NOAA Press Release, NOAA Fisheries Releases Report to Congress Identifying Three
Nations for Reported IUU Fishing Activities (Sept. 19, 2019), at https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/
noaa-fisheries-releases-report-congress-identifying-three-nations-reported-iuu-fishing [https://perma.cc/W578-
DB6B]. This biennial report to Congress is required under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Reauthorization Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-479, § 403, 120 Stat. 3575, 3626-27 (2007).
2 2019 NOAA Report, supra note 1, at 30.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Press Release, USTR to Request First-Ever Environment
Consultations Under the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) in Effort to Combat Illegal Fishing
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the environmental chapter of KORUS, which requires that “a party shall adopt, maintain, and
implement laws, regulations, and all other measures to fulfill its obligations under the mul-
tilateral environmental agreements listed in Annex 20-A,” including the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.8 U.S. officials then met with South
Korean counterparts in Seoul on October 17, 2019, and, within a few weeks of this meeting,
South Korea amended its Distant Water Fisheries Development Act to encompass adminis-
trative remedies.9
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer asserted that “the Trump Administration’s
strong commitment to using tools such as environmental monitoring and enforcement pro-
visions under our trade agreements can produce real results that help protect and conserve our
ocean resources.”10 These “first ever environment consultations” under KORUS came less
than a year after the USTR had pursued environmental consultations under the U.S. free
trade agreement with Peru.11 In 2019, there were thirteen U.S. free trade agreements that
featured environment chapters, including the not-yet-in-force United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA).12 In December of 2019, the Trump administration conceded
to more robust enforcement mechanisms for the USMCA’s environmental provisions in order
to ensure its approval in the House of Representatives.13
(Sept. 19, 2019), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/september/ustr-
request-first-ever [https://perma.cc/KLX3-DT9V].
8 U.S.-Kor. Free Trade Agreement, Art. 20.2, Annex 20-A at (1)(a), June 30, 2007, 125 Stat. 428, available at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file852_12719.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YA7G-L8GU]; see also id. Art. 20.9(1) (providing that “a Party may request consultations with the
other Party regarding any matter arising under this Chapter”).
9 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Press Release, USTR Welcomes Passage of Amendments to
Korea’s Distant Water Fisheries Development Act Following First Ever Environment Consultations Under the
United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (Nov. 1, 2019), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2019/november/ustr-welcomes-passage-amendments [https://perma.cc/5Y62-AVK6].
10 Id.
11 Id.; Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 640, 640–41 (2019) (discussing
the consultations with Peru). The USTR has also met in recent years with counterparts in Singapore to discuss
compliance with the environmental chapter of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative Press Release, Joint Statement on the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
Environment Chapter Meeting (Oct. 5, 2017), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/october/joint-statement-united-states-1 [https://perma.cc/25JN-USRY].
12 See Office of Envtl. Quality & Transboundary Issues, Current Trade Agreements with Environmental
Chapters, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 11, 2019), at https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-environmental-qual-
ity-and-transboundary-issues/current-trade-agreements-with-environmental-chapters [https://perma.cc/6MGW-
FVRE].
13 See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 114 AJIL 137, 141 (2020) (discussing the
Trump administration’s actions in securing congressional approval for the USMCA); see also Protocol of
Amendment to the Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and
Canada, Dec. 10, 2019, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Protocol-
of-Amendments-to-the-United-States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W6S-GHVL] (con-
taining the changes made in December 2019).
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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW
Congress Signals Concern About Human Rights Abuses in China
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.12
In late November of 2019, Congress passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and
Democracy Act of 2019 (HKHRDA) with overwhelming bipartisan backing. Although its
substantive provisions were modest in scope, this bill sent a strong indication of congressional
support for protesters in Hong Kong. Despite having some reservations about this bill,
President Trump signed it and a companion bill into law on November 27. The following
month, Congress signaled attention to another human rights situation in China—the treat-
ment of Uighurs in Xinjiang—by including a provision in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 that requires an executive-branch report on this issue.
In June 2019, large-scale protests broke out in Hong Kong in response to a proposed bill
that would have allowed defendants accused of certain crimes to be extradited to mainland
China.1 Following clashes with the police and the Hong Kong government, these protests
expanded into demands for greater political reforms.2 The protests continued over the follow-
ing months, though dwindling by early 2020.3
InNovember 2019, Congress signaled support for the protesters through the passage of the
HKHRDA. The section of the act setting forth policy objectives expressed strong support for
the people of Hong Kong with respect to autonomy, human rights, and “democratic
aspirations.”4 This section enumerated nine policy objectives, including the following:
It is the policy of the United States
. . .
(2) to support the high degree of autonomy and fundamental rights and freedoms of the
people of Hong Kong, as enumerated by –
(A) the joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong, done at Beijing December 19, 1984 . . .;
(B) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done at New York
December 19, 1966; and
(C) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, done at Paris December 10, 1948.5
1 Mike Ives,What Is Hong Kong’s Extradition Bill?, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/10/world/asia/hong-kong-extradition-bill.html.
2 Jin Wu, K.K. Rebecca Lai & Alan Yuhas, Six Months of Hong Kong Protests. How Did We Get Here?, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-arc.html?
action¼click&pgtype¼Article&state¼default&module¼styln-hong-kong&variant¼show&region¼TOP_
BANNER&context¼Menu.
3 Chuin-Wei Yap & JoyuWang,Hong Kong Protesters Refocus Ire on City’s Handling of Coronavirus Crisis, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2020), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-protesters-refocus-ire-on-citys-handling-of-
coronavirus-crisis-11580475635 (noting that “fears about the [newly emerging coronavirus] have deterred
large-scale gatherings”).
4 Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019, at § 3, Pub. L. 116-76, 133 Stat. 1161 (2019)
[hereinafter HKHRDA].
5 Id.
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The act contained various provisions aimed at supporting the protesters in Hong Kong.
Perhaps most importantly, the act requires annual recertification of Hong Kong’s special
status under the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992.6 Under this prior act,
Hong Kong retains the same status vis-à-vis the United States as it did before its incorporation
into China, meaning that it retains independent agreements with the United States on a num-
ber of fronts such as visa protections, trade, and the ability to freely trade the dollar.7 This
special status has significant economic advantages for Hong Kong (and therefore presumably
for China as well). Hong Kong’s special status can be suspended, however, if “the President
determines that Hong Kong is not sufficiently autonomous to justify treatment . . . different
from that accorded the People’s Republic of China.”8 The HKHRDA amends the 1992 act by
requiring the secretary of state to certify annually to Congress whether this special status
remains justified.9 In doing so, the secretary of state is to consider the extent to which
Hong Kong’s government upholds human rights and the rule of law.10 As one commentator
has observed, the HKHRDA “sets up an annual ritual . . . [which] will be noticed in China and
Hong Kong and will thus keep Hong Kong high on the agenda of U.S.-China relations well
into the next presidential administration.”11
The HKHRDA also includes two substantive provisions aimed at supporting the protesters.
First, it specifies that Hong Kong students remain eligible for U.S. visas notwithstanding
prior “politically-motivated” arrests.12 Second, the act requires the president to report on per-
sons who are responsible for serious human rights violations in Hong Kong and to impose
sanctions on these persons.13 While prior law likely already provided the executive branch
with authority in these two areas, the HKHRDA sends a clear congressional message that
the executive branch should support the protesters through its visa decisions and its use of
individualized sanctions.14
Alongside the HKHRDA, Congress also passed an act “[t]o prohibit the commercial export
of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force.”15 The act forbids the export of
items such as tear gas, pepper spray, and rubber bullets.16 The president may waive these
restrictions under certain conditions, and the act sunsets after one year.17
6 Id., § 4(a).
7 United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-383, 106 Stat. 1448 (1992).
8 Id., § 202(a).
9 HKHRDA, supra note 4, § 4(a) (also providing that the secretary of state can waive the certification require-
ment under certain conditions).
10 Id.
11 Julian Ku, The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act Is Redundant, but Still Worthwhile, LAWFARE
(Nov. 25, 2019), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/hong-kong-human-rights-and-democracy-act-redundant-still-
worthwhile.
12 HKHRDA supra note 4, § 4(b).
13 Id., § 7 (further providing that the president can waive these sanctions upon certification “that such a waiver is
in the national interests of the United States”).
14 Ku, supra note 11 (concluding that while “the HKHRDA is largely symbolic and redundant as a legal matter,”
the “political force of a message from a rarely united Congress during this era of impeachment is hard to
overstate”).
15 Pub. L. 116-77, 133 Stat. 1173 (2019).
16 Id., § 2(a).
17 Id., §§ 2(b), 3.
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Both bills passed with virtually no opposition in Congress,18 notwithstanding the back-
drop of comprehensive trade negotiations between the United States and China. In
October of 2019, the United States had announced a preliminary “phase one” trade deal,
but negotiations to finalize this deal were still ongoing at the time both bills passed in
November of 2019.19 After the HKHRDA had passed both houses of Congress, President
Trump was asked if he would veto it as requested by China, and he replied: “we have to
stand with Hong Kong but I’m also standing with President Xi. He’s a friend of mine . . .
we also are in the process of making the largest trade deal in history.”20
Nonetheless, on November 27, Trump signed both acts into law. He stated:
I signed these bills out of respect for President Xi, China, and the people of Hong Kong.
They are being enacted in the hope that Leaders and Representatives of China and Hong
Kong will be able to amicably settle their differences leading to long term peace and pros-
perity for all.21
In response, China’s ForeignMinistry commissioner to Hong Kong stated that the bill was
a “violation of China’s internal affairs.”22 China announced that it would suspend access to
Hong Kong for the U.S. military and would take action against several U.S. nonprofit orga-
nizations operating in Hong Kong.23 But following Trump’s decision to sign the bills, the
Chinese Commerce Ministry did not link these bills to the trade negotiations.24 The
“phase one” trade deal was formally signed on January 15, 2020.25
18 Patricia Zengerle & Richard Cowan, U.S. House Passes Hong Kong Rights Bills, Trump Expected to Sign,
REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2019), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-usa/us-house-passes-hong-
kong-human-rights-bills-idUSKBN1XU2CJ (noting only one recorded vote in opposition to either bill).
19 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 114 AJIL 137, 138 (2020) (describing the tim-
ing of the trade negotiations).
20 Trump Calls in to “Fox & Friends” Amid Impeachment Probe, Upcoming FISA Report, REAL CLEAR POLITICS, at
45:08 (Nov. 22, 2019), at https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/11/22/trump_calls_in_to_fox__friend-
s_amid_impeachment_probe_upcoming_fisa_report.html.
21 Donald J. Trump, Statement on Signing Legislation Regarding United States Policy Towards Hong Kong,
2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 837 (Nov. 27, 2019). Given the strong support for the HKHRDA in Congress, a
veto—if cast—might have been overridden. Trump issued an additional signing statement with respect to the
HKHRDA in which he stated that “[c]ertain provisions of the Act would interfere with the exercise of the
President’s constitutional authority to state the foreign policy of the United States” and that his “[a]dministration
will treat each of the provisions of the Act consistently with the President’s constitutional authorities with respect
to foreign relations.”Donald J. Trump, Statement on Signing the Hong KongHuman Rights andDemocracy Act
of 2019, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 832 (Nov. 27, 2019).
22 Owen Churchill & Teddy Ng, US’ Hong Kong Democracy Act Slanders China to a Level Close to Madness,
Foreign Minister Wang Yi Says, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 21, 2019), at https://www.scmp.com/
news/china/diplomacy/article/3038789/us-hong-kong-democracy-act-slanders-china-level-close-madness.
23 Gerry Shih, China Announces Sanctions Against U.S.-Based Nonprofit Groups in Response to Congress’s Hong
Kong Legislation, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/china-
announces-sanctions-against-us-based-nonprofits-in-response-to-congresss-hong-kong-legislation/2019/12/02/
9f414616-14e0-11ea-80d6-d0ca7007273f_story.html.
24 Keith Bradsher, Javier Hernández & Alexandra Stevenson, China Condemns U.S. Over Hong Kong. That
Won’t Stop Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/28/business/
china-hong-kong-trump-trade.html.
25 White House Press Release, President Donald J. Trump is Signing a Landmark Phase One Trade Agreement
with China (Jan. 15, 2020), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-sign-
ing-landmark-phase-one-trade-agreement-china [https://perma.cc/HV3J-5XTF].
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The U.S. government has also signaled concern about human rights violations in the
Chinese region of Xinjiang, where Chinese authorities have reportedly orchestrated the
detention, indoctrination, and forced labor of over a million Uighurs and other ethnic and
religiousminorities.26 OnOctober 7, 2019, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry
and Security limited the export of sensitive items to twenty-eight Chinese-associated govern-
mental and commercial organizations “that have been implicated in human rights violations
and abuses in China’s campaign targeting Uighurs. . . .”27 The following day, the State
Department issued visa restrictions on certain “Chinese government and Communist
Party officials who are believed to be responsible for . . . the detention or abuse of
Uighurs. . . .”28 In December of 2019, Congress included a provision in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 that required the intelligence agencies to pre-
pare “a report on activity by the People’s Republic of China to repress ethnic Muslim minor-
ities in the Xinjiang region of China.”29 The report is due in May 2020.30
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Issuing Several Pardons, President Trump Intervenes in Proceedings of U.S. Troops Charged or
Convicted of Acts Amounting to War Crimes
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.17
On November 15, 2019, President Trump pardoned or otherwise removed punishments
for three members of the military—Lieutenant Clint Lorance, Major Mathew Golsteyn, and
Chief Petty Officer Edward Gallagher—who had been found to commit, or had allegedly
committed, criminal acts abroad that amounted to war crimes. These actions follow
Trump’s May 2019 pardon of First LieutenantMichael Behenna, who had been found guilty
of murdering a detainee in Iraq. These intrusions into military proceedings were an unusual
use of the president’s pardon power and have raised concerns about the U.S. commitment to
international humanitarian law.
26 See Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, Leaked China Files Show Internment Camps Are Ruled by Secrecy and
Spying, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/world/asia/leak-chinas-intern-
ment-camps.html?searchResultPosition¼4; Eva Dou & Philip Wen, “Admit Your Mistakes, Repent”: China’s
Shifts Campaign to Control Xinjiang’s Muslims, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2020), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/
china-shifts-to-new-phase-in-campaign-to-control-xinjiangs-muslims-11580985000.
27 U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce Press Release, U.S. Department of Commerce Adds 28 Chinese Organizations to
Its Entity List (Oct. 7, 2019), at https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/10/us-department-com-
merce-adds-28-chinese-organizations-its-entity-list [https://perma.cc/T75K-LJDE].
28 U.S. Dep’t. of State Press Release, U.S. Department of State Imposes Visa Restrictions on Chinese Officials
for Repression in Xinjiang (Oct. 8, 2019), at https://www.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-imposes-visa-restric-
tions-on-chinese-officials-for-repression-in-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/HVD7-2378].
29 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, § 5512, Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 1198
(2019).
30 See id. (requiring the report with 150 days of the act’s passage). In December of 2019, the House of
Representatives passed, by a 407–1 vote, a bill that would authorize or require the imposition of various sanctions
and export controls related to China’s treatment of the Uighurs. Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/178/all-actions?overview¼closed&
q¼{%22roll-call-vote%22:%22all%22}&KWICView¼false [https://perma.cc/2KH8-9VQ3]. This bill is now
pending in the Senate. Id.
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The underlying crimes of the officer who received the first pardon, Behenna, occurred in
Iraq in 2008. Behenna killed an Iraqi man whom he had brought to a remote culvert, ordered
stripped naked, and begun interrogating at gunpoint.1 He defended the killing as an act of
self-defense, claiming that the man had reached for Behenna’s gun after throwing a piece of
concrete at him.2Members of a court-martial rejected Behenna’s self-defense claim, however,
and he was convicted of unpremeditated murder and assault.3 After serving approximately
five years in prison, Behenna was released on parole in 2014.4
Lorance was also convicted of murder, in his case for the killing of villagers in Afghanistan.5
Lorance had ordered his platoon to fire on unarmed villagers while in Afghanistan in July
2012, and two men died as a result.6 Following these deaths, Lorance falsely stated that he
was not able to complete a proper Battle Damage Assessment on the men because other vil-
lagers had already taken away their bodies.7 A member of Lorance’s platoon subsequently
reported him to the military authorities.8 Lorance was convicted in a court-martial of sec-
ond-degree murder and sentenced to a nineteen-year period of confinement.9
Golsteyn, although charged with premeditated murder after allegedly committing a war
crime in Afghanistan, never stood trial to face these charges. An Army investigation into
Golsteyn’s conduct found that Golsteyn and his fellow troops had detained a bomb-maker
they suspected to be responsible for a recent explosion at a military base in Afghanistan that
killed two Marines.10 After the man was questioned, Golsteyn and another U.S. troop had
killed him and burned his body.11 The Army investigated this killing, but only disciplined
Golsteyn by revoking his previously awarded Silver Star and transferring him out of the
Special Forces.12 The military reopened the investigation after Golsteyn publicly admitted to
1 United States v. Behenna, 71 M.J. 228, 230-31 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
2 Id. at 231.
3 Id. at 229; see alsoUniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Arts. 118, 128, 10 U.S.C. §§ 918, 928 (2012).
Behenna was charged specifically with unpremeditated murder and assault, rather than for violations of the law of
war through a UCMJ general court-martial or for violations of the War Crimes Act of 1996 through a federal
district court prosecution. Nonetheless, the underlying allegations giving rise to these charges described behavior
that amounted to a war crime. See 18U.S.C. § 2441 (2012) (defining war crimes as including grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions and, for noninternational armed conflicts, grave breaches of common Article 3). This applies
as well to the charges filed against Lorance, Golsteyn, and Gallagher.
4 White House Press Release, Statement From the Press Secretary Regarding Executive Clemency for Michael
Behenna (May 6, 2019), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regard-
ing-executive-clemency-michael-behenna [https://perma.cc/JE9Q-M5HC] [hereinafter Behenna Press Release].
5 United States v. Lorance, No. ARMY 20130679, 2017 WL 2819756, at *1–2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. June 27,
2017). Lorance was additionally convicted of attempted murder, wrongfully communicating a threat, reckless
endangerment, soliciting a false statement, and obstructing justice. Id.; see also UCMJ, Arts. 80, 118, 134, 10
U.S.C. §§ 880, 918, 934 (2012).
6 United States v. Lorance, supra note 5, at *2.
7 Id. at *3. In fact, Lorance told villagers to take away the bodies after two soldiers, who were not trained to
complete Battle Damage Assessments, “conducted a cursory inspection of the victims.” Id. at *2–3.
8 Id. at *3.
9 Id. at *1, 3.
10 Dan Lamothe, See Document Excerpts in the Army’s War-Crimes Case Against a Green Beret War Hero, WASH.
POST (May 19, 2015), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/05/19/see-document-
excerpts-in-the-armys-war-crimes-case-against-a-green-beret-war-hero.
11 Id.
12 Dan Lamothe, Trump’s Focus on an Army Murder Case Highlights a Divided Nation Still at War, WASH. POST
(Dec. 22, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trumps-focus-on-an-army-murder-
case-highlights-a-divided-nation-still-at-war/2018/12/21/b862b724-0465-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html.
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the killing of the suspected bomb-maker in a 2016 Fox News interview.13 Golsteyn was subse-
quently chargedwithmurder, andwas scheduled to be tried by court-martial in February 2020.14
Gallagher was charged with first-degree murder of an ISIS captive, for posing for a picture
with the dead body of the captive, and with attempted murder for shooting at several
unarmed civilians in Iraq.15 In July 2019, the members of the court-martial acquitted him
of the first-degree murder and attempted murder charges while convicting him for taking a
“trophy photo” with the dead captive’s body.16 Due to the time that Gallagher spent in con-
finement prior to his trial, he did not receive any further incarceration; however, the Navy
followed the members’ recommendation and demoted Gallagher by one rank.17
Trump’s first pardon with respect to these four men went to Behenna, who received it on
May 6, 2019.18 That day, theWhite House released a statement explaining that “Mr. Behenna
[was] entirely deserving of this Grant of Executive Clemency” because he was “a model pris-
oner” and his case “attracted broad support from the military, Oklahoma elected officials,
and the public.”19 Just over half a year later, on November 15, 2019, Trump signed pardons
for both Lorance and Golsteyn and ordered the reversal of Gallagher’s demotion in rank.20 The
related press announcement asserted the following justification:
The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the
law is enforced and when appropriate, that mercy is granted. For more than two hundred
13 Dan Lamothe,Matt Golsteyn Planned to Join the CIA and Go to Iraq. Now He Faces a Murder Charge, WASH.
POST (Feb. 9, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/they-do-not-obey-their-own-
rules-soldier-facing-murder-case-says-he-must-defend-himself-against-the-army/2019/02/09/a4cdb5b2-2baf-
11e9-97b3-ae59fbae7960_story.html;HowWe Fight: Part 3, FOX NEWS, at 1:57–3:11 (Nov. 4, 2016), at https://
video.foxnews.com/v/5197270526001#sp¼show-clips.
14 See USASOC Public Affairs Press Release, Article 32 Hearing to be Held for Accused Soldier (Jan. 16, 2019),
at https://www.army.mil/article/216229/article_32_hearing_to_be_held_for_accused_soldier [https://perma.cc/
QRP5-2DX2] (announcing that “the Special Court-Martial Convening Authority decided that Maj. Mathew
Golsteyn will proceed to an Article 32 Preliminary Hearing, . . . an initial step towards determining whether
Major Mathew Golsteyn violated Article 118 of the [UCMJ], Premediated Murder”); USASOC Public Affairs
Press Release, Maj. Mathew Golsteyn Trial Date Delayed Until February 19th (Nov. 14, 2019), at https://
www.army.mil/article/229836/maj_mathew_golsteyn_trial_date_delayed_until_february_19th [https://perma.
cc/4DXY-753U] (noting that Golsteyn’s trial was rescheduled to February 19, 2020).
15 Fellow Navy SEALs testified that Gallagher stabbed the ISIS captive “repeatedly in the neck” with a hunting
knife. Dave Philipps, Navy SEAL Chief Accused of War Crimes Is Found Not Guilty of Murder, N.Y. TIMES (July 2,
2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/navy-seal-trial-verdict.html. Gallagher then sent a photo of
him posing with the dead ISIS fighter to his friends in the United States, stating: “Good story behind this, got him
with my hunting knife.” Id. Gallagher was also charged, but acquitted, with obstruction of justice because of an
allegation that he had threatened to kill the SEALs in his platoon if they reported his conduct. Id.
16 Id. The acquittal was likely due to a fellow SEAL’s testimony taking responsibility for the killing of the ISIS
fighter. Id. Because this testimony contradicted earlier statements the SEAL—Special Operator First Class Corey
Scott—had made to the Navy, the Navy may charge Scott with perjury. Id.
17 Dave Philipps, Navy Reduces Punishment for SEAL in War Crimes Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/us/navy-seal-gallagher-clemency.html?searchResultPosition¼6.
18 Behenna Press Release, supra note 4.
19 Id.
20 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pardons Granted by President Donald Trump, Executive Grant of Clemency of
Mathew Golsteyn (Nov. 15, 2019), at https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-donald-
trump; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pardons Granted by President Donald Trump, Executive Grant of Clemency of
Clint A. Lorance (Nov. 15, 2019), at https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-donald-
trump; see also White House Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary (Nov. 15, 2019), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-97 [https://perma.cc/FF9D-KM96] [here-
inafter Golsteyn, Lorance, and Gallagher Press Release].
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years, presidents have used their authority to offer second chances to deserving individ-
uals, including those in uniform who have served our country. These actions are in keep-
ing with this long history. As the President has stated, “when our soldiers have to fight for
our country, I want to give them the confidence to fight.”21
Trump did not give any explanation for why he was pardoning Golsteyn before Golsteyn had
even been convicted of a crime.22 Following the November 15, 2019 announcement, the
Navy sought to discipline Gallagher by removing his trident pin—a badge of honor worn
by Navy SEALs.23 Trump overruled this decision as well, tweeting: “The Navy will NOT
be taking away Warfighter and Navy Seal Eddie Gallagher’s Trident Pin. This case was han-
dled very badly from the beginning. Get back to business!”24
Trump’s power to pardon resides in Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution: “The
President . . . shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for Offenses against the United
States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”25 This provision for pardons of “Offenses against
the United States” is understood to reach all crimes prosecuted by the United States, even
those occurring against noncitizens on foreign soil.26 Trump is not the first president to inter-
vene in a case in which the underlying conduct amounts to war crimes. President Nixon
allowed Lieutenant William Calley to stay under house arrest rather than in military confine-
ment during his appeal of his conviction for killing civilians in My Lai village during the
VietnamWar.27 But in giving full pardons to military personnel convicted of acts amounting
to war crimes, Trump’s use of his pardon power was highly unusual.28 Even more extraordi-
nary was Trump’s pardon of Golsteyn, who was still in the midst of his judicial proceedings.29
21 Golsteyn, Lorance, and Gallagher Press Release, supra note 20.
22 See generally id.
23 Dave Philipps, Trump Reverses Navy Decision to Oust Edward Gallagher From SEALs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/us/trump-seals-eddie-gallagher.html?action¼click&
module¼RelatedLinks&pgtype¼Article.
24 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2019, 8:30 AM), at https://twitter.com/real-
donaldtrump/status/1197507542726909952 [https://perma.cc/5MX5-7UHV].
25 U.S. CONST., Art. II, § 2.
26 See Dan Maurer, Should There Be a War Crime Pardon Exception, LAWFARE (Dec. 3, 2019), at https://www.
lawfareblog.com/should-there-be-war-crime-pardon-exception (“Ultimately, the difficulty of pardoning war
crimes lies in that most people do not consider it a difficult question at all—the president clearly has plenary,
unilateral discretion to grant a pardon.”); Chris Jenks, Sticking It to Yourself: Preemptive Pardons for Battlefield
Crimes Undercut Military Justice and Military Effectiveness, JUST SECURITY (May. 20, 2019), at https://www.just-
security.org/64185/sticking-it-to-yourself-preemptive-pardons-for-battlefield-crimes-undercut-military-justice-
and-military-effectiveness (commenting that “the President possesses the authority to pardon” individuals who
had allegedly committed war crimes, including Gallagher and Golsteyn).
27 7WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 577, 592 (Apr. 5, 1971) (also announcing the “President’s decision that before
any final sentence is carried out in the case of Lieutenant Calley, the President will personally review the case and
finally decide it”).
28 Donald J. Guter, John D. Hutson & Rachel VanLandingham, The American Way of War Includes Fidelity to
Law: Preemptive Pardons Break that Code, JUST SECURITY (May. 24, 2019), at https://www.justsecurity.org/64260/
the-american-way-of-war-includes-fidelity-to-law-preemptive-pardons-break-that-code; see also Maurer, supra
note 26 (“Though Trump’s acts of judicial mercy on service members may not be wholly original, they have
made him the first president to pardon soldiers—in this case, officers—already convicted of having committed
offenses that violate the international law of war.”).
29 Dave Philipps, Trump Clears Three Service Members in War Crimes Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/trump-pardons.html (quoting a retired military judge commenting on
Golsteyn’s pardon: “I’m not sure it’s ever been done”); see also Guter, Hutson & VanLandingham, supra note 28
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There was some domestic political support for Trump’s actions,30 but there were also
many politicians as well as military members who disagreed with the actions—apparently
including some officials inside the Pentagon.31 News reports indicate that Navy Secretary
Richard Spencer personally contacted Trump requesting that he not interfere publicly
with Gallagher’s discipline,32 and Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy, Defense Secretary
Mark T. Esper, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark A. Milley all opposed
the November pardons.33 Nonetheless, as noted above, Trump tweeted that the Navy
would not remove Gallagher’s Trident; further, Spencer was fired three days later by Esper
for having contacted Trump without going through the chain of command.34 Spencer
responded to Trump’s decision in a letter of resignation dated the same date that he was fired:
The Constitution, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, are the shields that set us
apart, and the beacons that protect us all. Throughmy Title Ten Authority, I have strived
to ensure our proceedings are fair, transparent and consistent, from the newest recruit to
the Flag and General Officer level.
Unfortunately it has become apparent that in this respect, I no longer share the same
understanding with the Commander in Chief who appointed me, in regards to the
key principle of good order and discipline.35
(“[W]e know of no modern (since the Civil War) precedent for a President’s cutting short ongoing military crim-
inal prosecutions of service members formally accused of violent crimes”).
30 See e.g., Behenna Press Release, supra note 4 (asserting that there was “broad support from the military,
Oklahoma elected officials, and the public”); Golsteyn, Lorance, andGallagher Press Release, supra note 20 (listing
congressional and public supporters for Trump’s pardon of Golsteyn and Lorance); see also Lindsay L. Rodman,
Post-9/11 Veterans Have Mixed Feelings About Trump’s War Crimes Pardons, JUST SECURITY (May 24, 2019), at
https://www.justsecurity.org/64256/post-9-11-veterans-have-mixed-feelings-about-trumps-war-crimes-pardons
(displaying polling data concerning public support for Trump’s pardons).
31 See e.g., Philipps, supra note 29 (“Top military leaders have pushed back hard against clearing the three men.
Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy have argued that such a move would under-
mine the military code of justice, and would serve as a bad example to other troops in the field, administration
officials said.”); Martin E. Dempsey (@Martin_Dempsey), TWITTER (May 21, 2019, 5:15 AM), at https://twitter.
com/Martin_Dempsey/status/1130809276191035392 [https://perma.cc/Z4J4-Z88X] (responding to Trump’s
actions, as a retired U.S. Army general and the eighteenth chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Absent evidence
of innocence or injustice the wholesale pardon of US servicemembers accused of war crimes signals our troops and
allies that we don’t take the Law of Armed Conflict seriously. Bad message. Bad precedent. Abdication of moral
responsibility. Risk to us.”); Alexander Bolton & Rebecca Kheel, Republicans Raise Concerns Over Trump
Pardoning Service Members, THE HILL (Dec. 3, 2019), at https://thehill.com/policy/defense/472910-republi-
cans-raise-concerns-over-trump-pardoning-service-members (quoting Senate Republicans who disagreed with
Trump’s actions, including Senator Lindsey Graham who was “concerned” about Trump’s interventions
“hav[ing] a chilling effect”).
32 Dan Lamothe & Josh Dawsey, Pentagon Chief Says He Was “Flabbergasted” by Navy Secretary’s Attempt to
Make a Private Deal with Trump, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/2019/11/25/pentagon-chief-says-he-was-flabbergasted-by-navy-secretarys-attempt-make-private-deal-
with-trump.
33 Id.
34 Id. (noting that Spencer had proposed to Trump that Gallagher could retire with his pin if Trump did not
publicly intervene).
35 Letter from Richard V. Spencer, U.S. Navy Secretary, to President Donald J. Trump (Nov. 24, 2019), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/read-navy-secretary-richard-spencer-s-letter-to-president-
trump/2bf70c2a-f811-43be-9e21-b02f1fe54a26.
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Rupert Colville, the spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, expressed dismay over the pardons.36 Colville stated that the three most recent acts of
leniency by Trump “involve serious violations of international humanitarian law” and, thus,
the pardons “run against the letter and the spirit of international law which requires account-
ability for such violations.”37 Colville specifically mentioned Golsteyn’s case as being “partic-
ularly troubling,” considering Trump’s failure to allow the judicial process to conclude before
intervening.38 Colville concluded: “These pardons send a disturbing signal to military forces
all around the world.”39
These pardons occurred while the International Criminal Court (ICC) was considering an
investigation into international crimes allegedly committed in Afghanistan, including by U.S.
personnel. In April 2019, the Trump administration revoked the U.S. visa of the ICC pros-
ecutor as she sought, following a preliminary investigation, to persuade the ICC’s Pre-Trial
Chamber (PTC) to authorize a full investigation into the situation in Afghanistan.40 Soon
after, the PTC denied her request, reasoning that the investigation would likely not be suc-
cessful due in part to the challenge of obtaining international cooperation.41 The PTC’s deci-
sion was appealed.42 Although the United States did not participate in this appeal, Trump’s
personal lawyer—Jay Sekulow—entered an appearance as amicus curiae on behalf of the
European Centre for Law and Justice seeking affirmance of the PTC decision.43 As part of
his oral argument on December 4, 2019, Sekulow submitted that “the United States is
demonstrably both willing and able to investigate and prosecute its own cases.”44 His brief
remarks did not discuss Trump’s recent pardons or their implications for the willingness and
ability of the United States to bring accountability to the perpetrators of war crimes.45 On
March 5, 2020, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC reversed the PTC decision and authorized
an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan.46
36 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Press Release, Press Brief on the United States (Nov.
19, 2019), at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID¼25314&LangID¼E
[hereinafter UNHCHR Press Release].
37 Id. As stated by the International Committee for the Red Cross, “States must investigate war crimes allegedly
committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.”
International Committee for the Red Cross, Rule 158: Prosecution of War Crimes, CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, at
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule158.
38 UNHCHR Press Release, supra note 36.
39 Id.
40 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 625, 625–28 (2019).
41 Id. at 629.
42 See International Criminal Court Press Release, Afghanistan: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Authorises
Prosecutor to Appeal Decision Refusing Investigation (Sept. 17, 2019), at https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.
aspx?name¼pr1479 [https://perma.cc/6SJS-LG5G].
43 See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-98OAOA2OA3OA4, Confirmation that
Mr Jay Alan Sekulow Will Make Oral Submissions at the Oral Hearing to Be Held Between 4 and 6 December
2019, at 3 (Oct. 24, 2019), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_06261.PDF.
44 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-T-001-ENG OA OA2 OA3 OA4, Appeals
Hearing Transcript, at 87 (Dec. 4, 2019), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2019_07359.PDF.
45 See generally id. at 84–87.
46 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-138, Judgment on the Appeal Against the
Decision on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation into the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
(Mar. 5, 2020), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo¼ICC-02/17-138.
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USE OF FORCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION
U.S. Drone Strike in Iraq Kills Iranian Military Leader Qasem Soleimani
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.15
On January 3, 2020, the U.S. military conducted a drone strike near Baghdad International
Airport that killedQasem Soleimani, the leader within the Iranianmilitary of theQuds Force of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Trump administration initially appeared
to justify the strike as an effort to deter imminent attacks on U.S. embassies and personnel, but
later insisted that Iran’s actions in the months leading up to the strike triggered the U.S. right to
self-defense. Domestically, the Trump administration claimed the authority to carry out the
strike based on both the president’s inherent constitutional powers and the Authorization for
Use of Military Force Against Iraq passed by Congress in 2002. In the aftermath of the strike,
Iraq voted to expel U.S. troops from its territory, and Iran conducted a missile strike on
American bases in Iraq. Iran also announced that it would cease to observe limits on its produc-
tion of nuclear fuel—a core tenet of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), from
which the United States withdrew in 2018.
Over the last few months of 2019, Iranian-backed militias, including Kataib Hezbollah,
launched multiple rocket attacks at U.S. military bases in Iraq.1 One such attack, undertaken
on December 27, killed a U.S. citizen who was working as a military contractor.2 Shortly
thereafter, the United States carried out airstrikes in Iraq and Syria against Kataib
Hezbollah, reportedly resulting in over twenty deaths.3 Following these airstrikes, militia sup-
porters tried unsuccessfully to storm the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.4 On December 31,
President Trump tweeted that “Iran will be held fully responsible for lives lost, or damage
incurred, at any of our facilities. They will pay a very BIG PRICE! This is not a Warning,
it is a Threat. Happy New Year.”5
On January 2, 2020, Trump ordered the U.S. military to conduct a precision drone strike
on two vehicles leaving the Baghdad International Airport in Iraq.6 The strike, carried out in
the early hours of the following day, targeted and killed Soleimani, who led the IRGC’s Quds
1 Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Launches Airstrikes on Iranian-Backed Forces in Iraq and Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30,
2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/world/middleeast/us-airstrikes-iran-iraq-syria.html.
2 Id.
3 Id. A U.S. State Department official explained that the strikes were “aimed at deterring Iran” and that “we are
not going to let Iran get away with using a proxy force to an attack – to attack American interests.” U.S. Dep’t
of State Press Release, Press Briefing by Senior State Department Officials on U.S. Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria
(Dec. 30, 2019), at https://www.state.gov/senior-state-department-officials-on-u-s-airstrikes-in-iraq-and-syria
[perma.cc/K9GZ-7HTJ].
4 Ghassan Adnan & Isabel Coles,Militia Supporters Retreat from U.S. Embassy Site in Iraq, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 1,
2020), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/protesters-retreat-from-u-s-embassy-site-in-iraq-11577891592.
5 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 31, 2019, 4:19 PM), at https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/1212121026072592384 [https://perma.cc/XE3D-K3AE].
6 Michael Crowley, Falih Hassan & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander of
Iranian Forces, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-
soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html. The Trump administration apparently also attempted a drone strike in Yemen
targeting senior IRGC official Abdul Reza Shahlai, although the strike ultimately failed. Eric Schmitt, Edward
Wong & Julian Barnes, U.S. Unsuccessfully Tried Killing a Second Iranian Military Official, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
10, 2020), at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/world/middleeast/trump-iran-yemen.html.
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Force, a special operations branch that carries out covert and military activities.7 The United
States has long deemed the Quds Force to be a supporter of terrorism, and, in April of 2017,
the United States designated the IRGC itself as a foreign terrorist organization for purposes of
a domestic statute, notwithstanding the IRGC’s status as an arm of a state.8 Both the George
W. Bush and Obama administrations reportedly considered, but ultimately rejected,
attempts to eliminate Soleimani due to concerns about the potential repercussions.9
Several other individuals were killed in the January 3 strike, including Abu Mahdi al-
Muhandis, an Iraqi who was a likely second intended target in light of his position as the
leader of Kataib Hezbollah.10
The international legality of the strike turns on the scope of the right to self-defense pro-
vided for by international law.11 Article 51 of the UN Charter allows states to exercise “the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.”12 Under customary international law, immi-
nent self-defense prior to an attack is widely recognized as permissible when the threat is
“instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice and means, and leaves no moment for delib-
eration.”13 The United States has previously articulated a more expansive view of imminence.
During the Obama administration, for example, the legal adviser to the State Department
identified multiple factors relevant to an imminence analysis and observed that, conditional
on “a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed attack is imminent,” the
“absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place or the precise nature of an
attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent.”14 The legal adviser
also explained “the view of the United States [that] once a State has lawfully resorted to force
in self-defense against a particular armed group following an actual or imminent attack by that
group, it is not necessary as a matter of international law to reassess whether an armed attack is
imminent prior to every subsequent action taken against that group.”15
7 Crowley, Hassan & Schmitt, supra note 6.
8 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 609, 609–11 n. 17 (2019) (noting that
the Department of Treasury had sanctioned the Quds Force as a terrorism supporter as far back as 2007).
9 ZekeMiller & Julie Pace,US Long Watched Soleimani, but Feared Risks of a Strike, AP NEWS (Jan. 4, 2020), at
https://apnews.com/57b4e6ffca604eb010b3dfd29aeeed2b.
10 Crowley,Hassan& Schmitt, supra note 6;Matthew S. Schwartz,WhoWas the Iraqi Commander Also Killed in
the Baghdad Drone Strike?, NPR (Jan. 4, 2020), at https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793618490/who-was-the-
iraqi-commander-also-killed-in-baghdad-drone-strike.
11 For a compilation of state reactions to the strike and its legality, see Mehrnusch Anssari & Benjamin
Nußberger, Compilation of States’ Reactions to U.S. and Iranian Uses of Force in Iraq in January 2020, JUST
SECURITY (Jan. 22, 2020), at https://www.justsecurity.org/68173/compilation-of-states-reactions-to-u-s-and-iranian-
uses-of-force-in-iraq-in-january-2020 (also compiling reactions to a later strike carried out by Iran).
12 UN Charter Art. 51.
13 See Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (July 27, 1842), in CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR.
WEBSTER AND LORD ASHBURTON 14 (1842) (articulating this test).
14 Brian Egan, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, Remarks to the American Society of International Law (Apr. 1,
2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/255493.htm [perma.cc/6BNY-URHH] [hereinafter
Egan Remarks]; see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United
States, 110 AJIL 587, 592 (2016) (discussing the standard set forth by Egan and considering how it related to
air strikes conducted against al-Shahaab).
15 Egan Remarks, supra note 14.
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The Department of Defense’s initial press release, published the night of the strike, justi-
fied the strike on the grounds that
General Soleimani was actively developing plans to attack American diplomats and ser-
vice members in Iraq and throughout the region. General Soleimani and his Quds Force
were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American and coalition service members
and the wounding of thousands more. He had orchestrated attacks on coalition bases in
Iraq over the last several months – including the attack on December 27th – culminating
in the death and wounding of additional American and Iraqi personnel. General
Soleimani also approved the attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad that took place
this week. This strike was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans.16
In the days that followed, the administration began to use the language of imminence, sug-
gesting that it sought to justify the strike as a preemptive measure in addition to—or perhaps
instead of—self-defense in response to prior attacks. Trump stated: “Soleimani was plotting
imminent and sinister attacks on American diplomats and military personnel, but we caught
him in the act and terminated him. . . . We took action last night to stop a war. We did not
take action to start a war.”17 Trump claimed that the administration had intelligence suggest-
ing that Soleimani was planning to bomb four U.S. embassies, including one in Iraq.18
16 U.S.Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Statement by theDepartment of Defense (Jan. 2, 2020), at https://www.
defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2049534/statement-by-the-department-of-defense [perma.cc/
2SUT-XK3V].
17 Donald J. Trump, Remarks on the Death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Major General and Quds
Force Commander Qasem Soleimani of Iran, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 005, at 1 (Jan. 3, 2020) (also stating
that “the recent attacks on U.S. targets in Iraq . . . were carried out at the direction of Soleimani”). The following
day, Trump tweeted that “if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have . . . targeted 52 Iranian sites
. . ., some at a very high level & important to Iran& the Iranian culture.”Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Jan. 4, 2020, 5:52 PM), at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1213593974679769093
[perma.cc/4NQJ-N2JE]. The secretary of defense later clarified that the United States would not target cultural
sites, as that would be impermissible under the law of armed conflict. Peter Baker &Maggie Haberman, Pentagon
Rules Out Striking Iranian Cultural Sites, Contradicting Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), at https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/01/06/us/politics/trump-esper-iran-cultural-sites.html. Iran expressed outrage at Trump’s
tweet, stating that the “threat to target Iranian cultural sites is certainly a flagrant violation of the basic norms
and principles of international law, and any attack against such sites would be a war crime.” Permanent Rep.
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Letter Dated 7 January 2020 to the United Nations Addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2020/16 (Jan. 8, 2020), at https://
undocs.org/en/S/2020/16.
18 Phillip Ruckert, John Hudson, Shane Harris & Josh Dawsey, “Four Embassies”: The Anatomy of Trump’s
Unfounded Claim About Iran, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/four-
embassies-the-anatomy-of-trumps-unfounded-claim-about-iran/2020/01/13/2dcd6df0-3620-11ea-bf30-
ad313e4ec754_story.html. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo similarly stated:
We had specific information on an imminent threat, and those threats included attacks on U.S. embassies . . . .
We don’t know exactly which day it would’ve been executed. But it was very clear: Qasem Soleimani himself
was plotting a broad, large-scale attack against American interests. And those attacks were imminent . . .
[a]gainst American facilities, including American embassies, military bases [and] American facilities through-
out the region.
Mike Pompeo, Sec’y of State Press Release, Press Briefing by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of
the Treasury Steven Mnuchin on Iran Sanctions (Jan. 10, 2020), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/press-briefing-secretary-state-mike-pompeo-secretary-treasury-steven-mnuchin-iran-sanctions [perma.cc/
P8UF-PJDD].
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The United States did not discuss imminence, however, when notifying the UN Security
Council of the strike pursuant to its obligations under Article 51 of the UN Charter.19
Instead, the United States defended the strike as a response to prior Iranian attacks. On
January 8—five days after the strike—the U.S. permanent representative to the United
Nations wrote to the Security Council that:
the United States has undertaken certain actions in the exercise of its inherent right of self-
defence. These actions were in response to an escalating series of armed attacks in recent
months by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iran-supportedmilitias onUnited States forces
and interests in the Middle East region, in order to deter the Islamic Republic of Iran from
conducting or supporting further attacks against the United States or United States inter-
ests, and to degrade the Islamic Republic of Iran and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Qods Force-supported militias’ ability to conduct attacks.20
The letter referred specifically to Iran’s destruction of a U.S. drone in June 2019, an Iranian
drone threat presented to a U.S. military ship in July 2019, and the attacks aimed at U.S.
military bases in Iraq by Kataib Hezbollah and other “Qods Force-backed militia groups
in Iraq.”21 The letter did not offer specific reasoning for its conclusion that the acts of the
militia groups could be attributed to Iran. In a subsequent domestic communication, the
administration similarly asserted that “[a]lthough the threat of further attack existed, recourse
to the inherent right of self-defense was justified sufficiently by the series of attacks that pre-
ceded the January 2 strike.”22
In response to the strike, the Iranian government promised “severe revenge”23 and con-
demned the strike as a violation of international law. Iran’s permanent representative to
the United Nations wrote:
Conducted “at the direction of the President” of the United States, the assassination of
Major General Qasem Soleimani, by any measure, is an obvious example of State terror-
ism and, as a criminal act, constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental principles of
international law, including, in particular, those stipulated in the Charter of the United
Nations, and thus entails the international responsibility of the United States. . . .
The designation, by one State, of an official branch of the armed forces of other State(s) as
19 See Permanent Rep. of U.S. to the UN, Letter Dated 8 January 2020 from the Permanent Representative of
the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc
S/2020/20 (Jan. 9, 2020), at https://undocs.org/en/S/2020/20.
20 Id.
21 Id.; see also Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 845, 847–48 (2019)
(describing the two drone-related incidents from the summer of 2019). For a critique of the legal reasoning under-
lying this letter, see Adil Ahmad Haque,U.S. Legal Defense of the Soleimani Strike at the United Nations: A Critical
Assessment, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 10, 2020), at https://www.justsecurity.org/68008/u-s-legal-defense-of-the-soleimani-
strike-at-the-united-nations-a-critical-assessment.
22 White House, Notice on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’Use of Military Force
and Related National Security Operations (2020), available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/
4/3/4362ca46-3a7d-43e8-a3ec-be0245705722/6E1A0F30F9204E380A7AD0C84EC572EC.doc148.pdf
[perma.cc/B5AQ-GXVQ] [hereinafter White House Notice].
23 Louisa Loveluck, Adam Taylor & Michael Brice-Saddler, Trump Says Iranian Military Leader Was Killed by
Drone Strike “to Stop aWar,”Warns Iran Not to Retaliate, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/iran-strike-live-updates/2020/01/03/3779f55c-2e33-11ea-bcb3-ac6482c4a92f_story.html.
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a so-called “foreign terrorist organization” constitutes a breach of generally recognized
principles of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations, including
the principle of sovereign equality of States, and cannot, under any circumstances, justify
any threat or use of force against them, including in the territory of other States.
Categorically rejecting all reasoning and references made by the officials of the United
States for justifying the criminal assassination of Martyr Major General Qasem
Soleimani, and condemning this heinous crime in the strongest possible terms, the
Islamic Republic of Iran reserves all of its rights under international law to take necessary
measures in this regard, in particular in exercising its inherent right to self-defence.24
In a subsequent communication, Iran’s permanent representative “categorically reject[ed]
the attribution to Iran” of attacks carried out by militias and disputed U.S. claims that the
drone-related incidents over the summer of 2019 could serve as international legal justifica-
tions for the U.S. strike.25
Because the U.S. airstrike occurred on the territory of Iraq, a further international legal
issue is whether the United States violated its legal duty to “refrain . . . from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence” of Iraq.26 The govern-
ment of Iraq did not indicate that it had given consent to the strike, instead swiftly denounc-
ing it as a violation of international law. The Iraqi permanent representative to the United
Nations wrote:
The Government of the Republic of Iraq condemns in the strongest possible terms these
American attacks, which violate the sovereignty of Iraq and the principles of international
law. It stresses that it is fully committed to the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution and, in
particular, the provision that Iraqi territory shall not be used as a theatre of operations
against neighbouring States. It is committed to ensuring that foreign forces active in
Iraq at its request do not come under attack. It emphasizes that any military mobilization
or operations on Iraqi territory that take place without its approval and without prior
coordination constitute provocative and hostile acts that violate the Charter of the
United Nations . . . .27
24 Permanent Rep. of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN, Letter Dated 3 January 2020 from the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council, UNDoc. S/2020/13 (Jan. 3, 2020), at https://undocs.org/S/2020/13 (footnote
omitted). Iran’s Foreign Minister claimed the strike
violated territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq . . . . This was an act of aggression, an armed attack, albeit
a cowardly armed attack, against an Iranian official in foreign territory. It amounts to war, and we will
respond according to our own timing and choice . . . . [I]n exercising our right to self-defense, we are
only bound by international law, unlike the United States, which is not bound by international law.
Transcript: NPR’s Full Interview with Iran’s Foreign Minister, NPR (Jan. 7, 2020), at https://www.npr.org/2020/
01/07/794175782/transcript-nprs-full-interview-with-iran-s-foreign-minister?t¼1578520157145.
25 Permanent Rep. of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN, Letter Dated 29 January 2020 from the
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2020/81 (Jan. 30, 2020), at https://undocs.
org/pdf?symbol¼en/S/2020/81 [perma.cc/E7ZB-6K8Q].
26 See UN Charter Art. 2(4).
27 Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the UN, Identical Letters Dated 6 January 2020 from the Permanent Representative
of Iraq to theUnitedNations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UNDoc. S/2020/15 (Jan. 6, 2020),
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The United States has previously taken the position that, in acting in self-defense under
Article 51, it may use force against a nonstate actor on the territory of a state whose govern-
ment does not consent to the use of force, provided that this state is “unwilling or unable” to
prevent the actual or imminent threat posed by the nonstate actor.28 To date, the Trump
administration has not explicitly invoked the “unwilling or unable” argument—which
would need to be expanded to include uses of force against the agents of foreign states—as
justifying its decision to carry out the strike on Iraqi territory. Discussing the attacks by
Iran-backed militias in a press briefing shortly before the Soleimani strike, State
Department officials observed that “we do not make a distinction between the Iranian regime
and any of its proxies that they organize, train, and equip,” and that the “the Iraqi
Government needs to ensure the safety of American forces [in Iraq], and there’s just been
too many attacks, attempted attacks against American and Iraqi forces.”29
Domestically, the executive branch reportedly did not notify Congress of the strike before-
hand, but did submit a report on the strike on January 4.30 The report was fully classified and
the briefing was held behind closed doors, rather than the usual procedure of sending an
unclassified report with a classified annex.31 On February 14, the administration released a
document summarizing its legal justifications for the strike, consistent with the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 as amended, which requires notification of
changes to legal and policy frameworks for uses of force.32
at https://undocs.org/en/S/2020/15; accordGovernment of Iraq - العراقيةلحكومةا (@IraqiGovt), TWITTER (Jan. 3, 2020,
5:11 AM), at https://twitter.com/IraqiGovt/status/1213040106115866626 [perma.cc/TWZ2-KWP4] (quoting
Iraqi PrimeMinister Adil Abdul-Mahdi as stating: “We condemn in the strongest terms the assassination byUS forces
of Iraqi and Iranian figures who were symbols of the victory against Daesh”).
28 E.g., Egan Remarks, supra note 14 (stating that this “unable or unwilling standard” applies “only in those
exceptional circumstances in which a State cannot or will not take effective measures to confront a non-State actor
that is using its territory as a base for attacks and related operations against other States”); Permanent Rep. of U.S.
to the UN, Letter Dated 23 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014), available at
securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_695.pdf
(using an “unwilling or unable” argument in 2014 to justify airstrikes in Syria targeting ISIL).
29 Press Briefing by Senior StateDepartmentOfficials, supra note 3.One official referenced a 2018 statement by
the White House condemning Iran for “not act[ing] to stop [certain] attacks by its proxies in Iraq, which it has
supported with funding, training, and weapons” and stating that the “United States will hold the regime in Tehran
accountable for any attack that results in injury to our personnel or damage to United States Government facil-
ities.”White House Press Release, Statement by the Press Secretary (Sept. 11, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-33 [https://perma.cc/PKC9-FU48]; see also Press Briefing by
Senior State Department Officials, supra note 3 (referencing this statement).
30Maggie Haberman&Catie Edmondson,White House Notifies Congress of Suleimani Strike UnderWar Powers
Act, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2020), at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/us/politics/white-house-war-powers-
resolution.html. The War Powers Resolution requires the president to notify Congress within forty-eight hours
of the introduction of U.S. military forces into hostilities. 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2018).
31 John B. Bellinger III,Does the U.S. Strike on Soleimani Break Legal Norms?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 6,
2020), at https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/does-us-strike-soleimani-break-legal-norms; see also Letter from Senators
Charles E. Schumer and Robert Menendez to President Donald Trump (Jan. 5, 2020), available at https://
www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/010520cMenendez%20Shcumer%20Letter%20War%20Powers.pdf
[perma.cc/73NV-3M8X] (asking the president to declassify the War Powers notification because “[a]n entirely
classified notification is simply not appropriate in a democratic society, and there appears to be no legitimate jus-
tification for classifying this notification”).
32 Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1264, 131 Stat. 1689-90 (2017), amended by Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1261 (2019);
White House Notice, supra note 22.
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This notice invoked two separate domestic legal bases for the strike. First, it relied on the
president’s constitutional power as commander in chief under Article II of the Constitution.
Second, it claimed statutory authorization for the strike based on the 2002 congressional stat-
ute that had authorized the Second GulfWar in Iraq. The notice provided a brief explanation
of the reasoning underlying these claims. It stated:
Article II of the United States Constitution empowers the President, as Commander in
Chief, to direct the use of military forces to protect the Nation from an attack or threat of
imminent attack and to protect important national interests. Article II thus authorized
the President to use force against forces of Iran, a state responsible for conducting and
directing attacks against United States forces in the region. In addition, under the 2002
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (2002 AUMF) “the President is
authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary
and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the
continuing threat posed by Iraq.”Although the threat posed by SaddamHussein’s regime
was the initial focus of the statute, the United States has long relied upon the 2002
AUMF to authorize the use of force for the purpose of establishing a stable, democratic
Iraq and addressing terrorist threats emanating from Iraq. Such uses of force need not
address threats from the Iraqi Government apparatus only, but may address threats to
the United States posed by militias, terrorist groups, or other armed groups in Iraq.
The airstrike against Soleimani in Iraq is consistent with this longstanding interpretation
of the President’s authority under Article II and the 2002 AUMF. Iran’s past and recent
activities, coupled with intelligence at the time of the air strike, indicated that Iran’s Qods
Force posed a threat to the United States in Iraq, and the air strike against Soleimani was
intended to protect United States personnel and deter future Iranian attack plans against
United States forces and interests in Iraq and threats emanating from Iraq. The use of
military force against Iranian Armed Forces was tailored narrowly to the identified
Qods Force target’s presence in Iraq and support to, including in some cases direction
of, Iraqi militias that attacked United States personnel.33
While the Obama administration had taken the position that the 2002 AUMF applied to
U.S. military actions against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), at least within Iraq,34
the Trump administration’s extension of the interpretation of the 2002 AUMF to encompass
military actions against Iran is notable. Anticipating such an extension and concerned about
its legal validity, members of Congress inquired during the summer of 2019 whether the
administration considered itself to have statutory authority to use force against Iran based
on the 2002 AUMF or the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed in 2001 (2001
AUMF), which authorized the use of force in response to the terrorist attacks of
33 White House Notice, supra note 22 (footnotes omitted). For criticism of the legal reasoning underlying the
notice, see Ryan Goodman, White House “1264 Notice” and Novel Legal Claims for Military Action Against Iran,
JUST SECURITY (Feb. 14, 2020), at https://www.justsecurity.org/68594/white-house-1264-notice-and-novel-legal-
claims-for-military-action-against-iran.
34 See President Barack Obama, Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate (Sept. 23, 2014), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/
letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq [https://perma.cc/6JFQ-69LX].
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September 11, 2001.35 In response, the State Department represented that “the
Administration’s goal is to find a diplomatic solution to Iran’s activities, not to engage in con-
flict with Iran” and that “the Administration has not, to date, interpreted either AUMF as
authorizing military force against Iran, except as may be necessary to defend U.S. or partner
forces engaged in counterterrorism operations or operations to establish a stable, democratic
Iraq.”36 In concluding that the 2002 AUMF authorized the strike against Soleimani, the
Trump administration signaled a capacious understanding of the self-defense that it inter-
preted the 2002 AUMF to authorize.
Following the strike, a majority of both houses of Congress signaled strong concern about
unconstrained executive-branch uses of force against Iran. On January 13, 2020, by a vote of
224–194, theHouse of Representatives passed a resolution finding that “Congress has not autho-
rized the President to usemilitary force against Iran.”37 The resolution “direct[ed] the President to
terminate the use of United States Armed Forces to engage in hostilities in or against Iran or any
part of its government or military” in the absence of specific congressional authorization or the
need to defend “against an imminent armed attack upon the United States . . . or its Armed
Forces.”38 One month later, on February 13, the Senate passed a similar resolution calling for
the cessation of hostilities by a vote of 55–45.39 Though the Senate resolution is expected to
pass the House as well, Trump is likely to veto it.40 Based on the roll call for the House and
Senate resolutions, Congress does not have the two-thirds supermajority needed to override a veto.
The strike on Soleimani prompted a strong reaction in Iraq. Most notably, on January 5,
2020, two days after the strike, the Iraqi parliament voted to expel U.S. troops from Iraq.41
But despite this vote, the United States has remained in Iraq, and it is unclear what steps, if
any, the Iraqi government will take to trigger U.S. withdrawal.
Iran responded to the strikewith several significant actions.On January 5, Iran announced that
it was abandoning the limitations on its production of nuclear fuel contained in the JCPOA.42
35 Galbraith, supra note 21, at 845–48 (describing these inquiries).
36 Letter from Mary Elizabeth Taylor, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Legis. Aff., to Eliot L. Engel, Chairman,
H. Comm. on Foreign Aff. (June 28, 2019), available at https://perma.cc/9YLU-59FL.
37 H.R. Con. Res. 83, 116th Cong. (2020); 166 CONG. REC. H115 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2020) (Roll No. 7).
38 H.R. Con. Res. 83, 116th Cong. (2020).
39 See S.J. Res. 68, 116th Cong. (2020) (stating that, subject to an exception for defense against imminent
attacks aimed at the United States, “Congress hereby directs the President to terminate the use of United
States Armed Forces for hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran or any part of its government or military,
unless explicitly authorized by a declaration of war or specific authorization for use of military force against Iran”);
166 CONG. REC. S1061 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2020) (Vote No. 52). Because theWar Powers Resolution set up a fast-
track process for the consideration of such resolutions, this resolution progressed in the Senate without being sub-
ject to the filibuster and, like the parallel resolution in the House, benefited from other expedited procedures. See
50 U.S.C. § 1546 (2018).
40 Catie Edmondson, In Bipartisan Bid to Restrain Trump, Senate Passes IranWar Powers Resolution, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 13, 2020), at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/politics/iran-war-powers-trump.html; see Exec.
Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy (2020), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SAP_SJ-RES-68.pdf [perma.cc/S9WQ-VA5L] (“If S.J. Res. 68 were presented
to the President, his advisors would recommend that he veto the joint resolution.”).
41 Arwa Ibrahim, Iraqi Parliament Calls for Expulsion of Foreign Troops, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 5, 2020), at https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/iraqi-parliament-calls-expulsion-foreign-troops-200105150709628.html.
42 LaurelWamsley &Emily Kwong, Iran Abandons Nuclear Deal Limitations inWake of Soleimani Killing, NPR
(Jan. 5, 2020), at https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793814276/iran-abandons-nuclear-deal-limitations-in-
wake-of-soleimani-killing.
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW320 Vol. 114:2
Since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018,43 Iran had been moving away
from full compliance with its terms, but this development was a significant additional step. In
response to Iran’s announcement, Britain, France, and Germany triggered the dispute reso-
lution provision of the JCPOA, causing Iran to threaten withdrawal from the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should this dispute settlement process lead to a refer-
ral to the UN Security Council.44 Separate from the announcement related to the JCPOA, the
Iranian parliament expressed fury at the U.S. strike, passing a bill on January 7 that designated
U.S. military members as terrorists.45
The government of Iran also took military action against the United States in response to
the strike. On January 8, the IRGC launched sixteen ballistic missiles at U.S. military bases in
Iraq, though claiming that the missiles were “not intend[ed] to kill.”46 The Iranian strike
caused some damage to the bases but killed no one.47 In the weeks that followed, however,
the Pentagon announced that over one hundred U.S. troops had suffered brain injuries
from the strike.48 Though the missile strike came after Iran repeatedly promised “revenge”
for Soleimani’s death,49 Iran stated in its Article 51 notification to the UN Security Council
that
in the early morning hours (Tehran time), in exercising our inherent right to self-defence
in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the armed forces of
the Islamic Republic of Iran took and concluded a measured and proportionate military
response targeting an American air base in Iraq from which the cowardly armed
attack against Martyr Soleimani was launched. The operation was precise and targeted
43 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 514 (2018) (discussing the U.S. with-
drawal in 2018 from the JCPOA).
44 Babak Dehghanpisheh, Iran Says It Will Quit Global Nuclear Treaty If Case Goes to UN, REUTERS (Jan. 20,
2020), at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-nuclear/iran-says-it-will-quit-global-nuclear-treaty-if-case-goes-
to-u-n-idUKKBN1ZJ0L5. The United States also imposed a new round of sanctions against Iran in response
to Iran’s announcement. Mike Pompeo, Sec’y of State Press Release, Designation of the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, Its Head Ali Akbar Salehi and Renewing Nuclear Restrictions (Jan. 31, 2020), at https://
www.state.gov/designation-of-the-atomic-energy-organization-of-iran-its-head-ali-akbar-salehi-and-renewing-
nuclear-restrictions [perma.cc/9UPR-MUGS].
45 Iran’s Parliament Designates All US Forces As “Terrorists,” AL JAZEERA (Jan. 7, 2020), at https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2020/01/iran-parliament-designates-forces-terrorists-200107081230324.html.
46 Kareem Fahim & Sarah Dadouch, “We Did Not Intend to Kill,” Iranian Commander Says of Missile Strike on
U.S. Targets, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/missile-strike-
on-us-bases-did-not-intend-to-kill-says-iranian-commander/2020/01/09/c5c2295c-3260-11ea-971b-
43bec3ff9860_story.html; Shane Harris, Josh Dawsey, Dan Lamothe &Missy Ryan, “Launch, Launch, Launch”:
Inside the Trump Administration as the Iranian Missiles Began to Fall, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2020), at https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-officials-knew-iranian-missiles-were-coming-hours-in-advance/2020/
01/08/b6297b4c-3235-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_story.html. The same day as launching the missile strikes on
U.S. bases, Iran shot down a Ukrainian passenger flight that was allegedly misidentified as a cruise missile, killing
all 176 people on board. Plane Shot Down Because of Human Error, Iran Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2020), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/world/middleeast/plane-crash.html. The Iranian government claimed
that “[h]uman error at time of crisis caused by US adventurism led to disaster.” Javad Zarif (@JZarif), TWITTER
(Jan. 10, 2020, 8:05 PM), at https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1215847283381755914 [perma.cc/YF8T-5Z9G].
47 Harris, Dawsey, Lamothe & Ryan, supra note 46.
48 Lolita C. Baldor, Pentagon: 109 Troops Suffer Brain Injuries from Iran Strike, AP NEWS (Feb. 10, 2020), at
https://apnews.com/eabf6766d717a2dd518a3c6319bb2430 (noting that “nearly 70 percent of those diagnosed
[had] return[ed] to duty”).
49 E.g., Loveluck, Taylor & Brice-Saddler, supra note 23.
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military objectives, thus leaving no collateral damage to civilians and civilian assets in the
area.50
The letter “reiterate[d] the full respect of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the independence,
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iran.”51 The letter did not detail
how the Iranian strikes would deter against future attacks, as distinct from amounting to a
reprisal, and nor did it explain how these strikes were consistent with Iran’s international legal
obligations toward Iraq.
Iraq protested the Iranian strike as a violation of international law:
For Iraqi territory to be bombarded by the Islamic Republic of Iran on the pretext of self-
defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations is unacceptable and
constitutes a breach of the sovereignty of Iraq and a violation of the principles of
good-neighbourliness, the Charter of the United Nations and international law.52
In response to the Iranian missiles, Trump authorized additional sanctions on Iran,53 and
the administration imposed sanctions against eight senior Iranian officials54 and added sev-
enteen sanctions targeting the metals industry in Iran.55 But Trump seemed to reject further
military action:
Iran appears to be standing down, which is a good thing for all parties concerned and a
very good thing for the world. . . . The fact that we have this great military and equip-
ment, however, does not mean we have to use it. We do not want to use it. American
strength, both military and economic, is the best deterrent. . . . [T]o the people and lead-
ers of Iran:We want you to have a future and a great future – one that you deserve, one of
prosperity at home, and harmony with the nations of the world. The United States is
ready to embrace peace with all who seek it.56
Although neither the United States nor Iran have engaged in overt strikes against each
other in the immediate aftermath of Iran’s January 8 strike, tensions between the two coun-
tries remain high throughout the region.57 In mid-January, the U.S. Maritime
50 Permanent Rep. of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN, Letter Dated 8 January 2020 from the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and
the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2020/19 (Jan. 8, 2020), at https://undocs.org/en/S/2020/19.
51 Id.
52 Permanent Rep. of the Republic of Iraq to the UN, Identical Letters Dated 9 January 2020 from the
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General
and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2020/26 (Jan. 9, 2020), at https://undocs.org/S/2020/26
[perma.cc/A3RR-TLQC]. For analysis of international reactions and the legality of the Iranian strike, see Anssari
& Nußberger, supra note 11.
53 Exec. Order 13,902, 85 Fed. Reg. 2003 (Jan. 14, 2020).
54 Mike Pompeo, Sec’y of State Press Release, Intensified Sanctions on Iran (Jan. 10, 2020), at https://www.
state.gov/intensified-sanctions-on-iran [perma.cc/A6D4-5L42].
55 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Press Release, Treasury Targets Iran’s Billion Dollar Metals Industry and Senior
Regime Officials (Jan. 10, 2020), at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm870 [perma.cc/B4KC-
JXVX].
56 White House Press Release, President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on Iran (Jan. 8, 2020),
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran [perma.cc/94PF-DGSL].
57 In mid-March of 2020, the United States carried out further strikes against Kataib Hezbollah, following the
death of two U.S. service-members from rockets attributed to Iranian-backed militias. Louisa Loveluck,
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Administration warned of continuing “serious threats to commercial vessels” by Iran and its
proxies in the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea,58 causing increased patrols by countries
whose industries rely on passage through the strait.59 On February 9, while patrolling the
area, the United States intercepted Iranian-made weapons destined for the Houthi rebels
in Yemen,60 who have been fighting a Saudi-led and U.S.-backed coalition since 2015.61
In Syria, Iran has continued to back the Syrian government forces, who have engaged in a
months-long offensive to retake Idlib, which sits on the Syrian-Turkish border and has
been the last rebel-held area.62 The United States has condemned the “unjustifiable, and
ruthless assaults on the people of Idlib” and reiterated that it “stand[s] by [its] NATO Ally
Turkey.”63
United States Creates the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Space Force to Strengthen Military
Capabilities in Space
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.13
President Trump first announced his plans for increasing U.S. military capabilities in space
in 2018. In August 2019, his administration created the United States Space Command.
With the passage in December 2019 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, the
United States established the United States Space Force as a new branch of the armed forces.
Dan Lamothe & Mustafa Salim, U.S. Counters Iraq’s Condemnation of Airstrikes on Iran-Backed Militia Facilities,
WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraq-condemns-us-strikes-on-iran-
backed-militias-say-they-killed-soldiers-and-a-civilian/2020/03/13/33650322-6519-11ea-8a8e-5c53
36b32760_story.html.
58 2020-001-Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian
Ocean-Threats to Commercial Vessels by Iran and its Proxies, MARAD (Jan. 13, 2020), at https://maritime.dot.
gov/content/2020-001-persian-gulf-strait-hormuz-gulf-oman-arabian-sea-red-sea-gulf-aden-and-indian-ocean
[perma.cc/G8RS-3S3Z].
59 Tim Kelly, Japanese Warship Departs for Gulf to Patrol Oil Lifeline, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2020), at https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-japan/japanese-warship-departs-for-gulf-to-patrol-oil-lifeline-
idUSKBN1ZW02D.
60 SeeU.S. Central Command Press Release, USNavy Seizes IllegalWeapons in Arabian Sea (Feb. 13, 2020), at
https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/2083824/us-navy-seizes-
illegal-weapons-in-arabian-sea [perma.cc/6JNF-L6HU] (describing the seizure of weapons resembling those made
by Iran); Mike Pompeo (@SecPompeo), TWITTER (Feb, 14, 2020), at https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/
1228285173936140290 [perma.cc/S5MG-54M3] (“The U.S. Navy interdicted 358 Iranian-made missiles +
other weapons components on their way to the Houthis in Yemen”); see generally Panel of Experts on Yemen,
Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, Transmitted Letter Dated 27 January 2020 from the Panel of
Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2020/70 (Jan. 27, 2020),
at https://undocs.org/s/2020/70 (discussing Iranian support for the Houthis, including potentially illicitly provid-
ing weapons).
61 Claire Parker & Rick Noack, Iran Has Invested in Allies and Proxies Across the Middle East. Here’s Where They
Stand After Soleimani’s Death, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/
03/iran-has-invested-allies-proxies-across-middle-east-heres-where-they-stand-after-soleimanis-death.
62 Id.; Adam Taylor, The Idlib Crisis Is a Reminder that the Syrian War Is Not Over, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2020),
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/02/06/idlib-crisis-is-reminder-that-syrian-war-is-not-over.
63 Mike Pompeo, Sec’y of State Press Release, Escalation of Violence in Idlib (Feb. 4, 2020), at https://www.
state.gov/escalation-of-violence-in-idlib [perma.cc/UZ49-JXMB].
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These developments do not directly implicate international law, but they reflect a growing
divergence between the U.S. approach to space and that taken by the UNGeneral Assembly.
In June 2018, Trump publicly announced his intention to establish “‘American domi-
nance in space’” through the creation of a Space Force.1 His announcement came after the
release of the “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” which
warned of China and Russia’s capacity to “offset any perceived US military advantage derived
frommilitary, civil, or commercial space systems” through their antisatellite weapons, should
the United States engage in military confrontation with the two countries.2 A year later, on
August 29, 2019, the Pentagon established the U.S. Space Command as a new geographic
combatant command.3 The U.S. Space Command is authorized to employ assigned forces
from the various military service branches to achieve its mission “to deter aggression and con-
flict, defend U.S. and allied freedom of action, deliver space combat power for the
Joint/Combined force, and develop joint warfighters to advance U.S. and allied interests
in, from, and through the space domain.”4
During the preparations for the negotiations between theWhite House and Congress over
the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (2020 NDAA), Trump reportedly instructed
White House negotiators to make the creation of the Space Force their most important pri-
ority.5 As a military service branch focused on space, the Space Force would complement the
1 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 634, 638 (2019) (quoting Associated
Press, Trump Announces Creation of Space Force, YOUTUBE (June 18, 2018), at https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Kna3YYX7XeE). A Space Command had previously existed within the U.S. military from 1985–2002. Id. at
638 n. 24.
2 Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment
of the US Intelligence Community 13 (2018), available at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/
Testimonies/2018-ATA—Unclassified-SSCI.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PGY-ANKM].
3 U.S. Space Command Press Release, United States Space Command Fact Sheet (Aug. 29, 2019), at https://
www.spacecom.mil/About/Fact-Sheets-Editor/Article/1948216/united-states-space-command-fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/U36G-YJHM]; U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, JimGaramone, Pentagon Rolls Out Space
Command (Aug. 29, 2019), at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1948420/pentagon-rolls-
out-space-command [https://perma.cc/3P7L-HZU5]. A Combatant Command is “a military command which
has broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments.” 10
U.S.C. § 161(c)(1) (2018). Currently, there are eleven Combatant Commands, of which six are geographic com-
mands and five are functional commands. KATHLEEN J. MCINNIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10542, DEFENSE
PRIMER: COMMANDING U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS 2 (2020). The three military departments are the
Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
HEIDI M. PETERS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10550, DEFENSE PRIMER: THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 1 (2018).
The decision to establish the Space Command as a full Combatant Command, as distinct from a sub-unified com-
mand within a preexisting Combatant Command, was in tension with a prior congressional statute. SeeGalbraith,
supra note 1, at 639. This prior statute was repealed in December of 2019, several months after the establishment
of the Space Command. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1601,
133 Stat. 1198 (2019) [hereinafter 2020 NDAA].
4 United States Space Command Fact Sheet, supra note 3. The military service branches, also known as the
armed forces, refer to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, and, most recently,
the Space Force. See U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Department of Defense Establishes U.S. Space Force
(Dec. 20, 2019), at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2045981/department-of-
defense-establishes-us-space-force [https://perma.cc/SMC3-7G27] [hereinafter DOD Press Release] (noting
“the establishment of the U.S. Space Force as the sixth branch of the armed forces”); PETERS, supra note 3 (listing
the branches of the armed forces).
5 Jeff Stein, Lisa Rein & Josh Dawsey, Democrats Leveraged Trump’s Fixation on Space Force to Pursue Parental-
Leave Victory for Federal Workers, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/democrats-leveraged-trumps-fixation-on-space-force-to-pursue-parental-leave-victory-for-federal-
workers/2019/12/08/92f290fc-19ce-11ea-826b-14ef38a0f45f_story.html.
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mission-focused Space Command. To secure Democratic support for the creation of the
Space Force, the White House conceded to the inclusion of a provision for twelve-week
paid parental leave for civilian federal employees.6 Trump signed the 2020 NDAA into
law on December 20, 2019,7 thus establishing the United States Space Force (USSF) within
the Department of the Air Force.8
The USSF is headquartered in the Pentagon and is the sixth branch of the armed forces.9
According to the USSF’s mission statement:
The USSF is a military service that organizes, trains, and equips space forces in order to
protect U.S. and allied interests in space and to provide space capabilities to the joint
force. USSF responsibilities include developing military professionals, acquiring military
space systems, maturing the military doctrine for space power, and organizing space
forces to present to [the] Combatant Commands.10
As the USSF is situated within the Department of the Air Force, the secretary of the air
force—overseen by the secretary of defense—is responsible for the USSF.11 In turn, the chief
of space operations, a four-star general and a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serves as
the “principal uniformed advisor to the Secretary of the Air Force on Space Force activities.”12
The United States is party to the Outer Space Treaty, which obligates states to “carry on
activities in the exploration and use of outer space . . . in accordance with international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international
peace and security.”13 The treaty bars the “place[ment] in orbit around the earth [of] any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” and
limits the use of the “moon and other celestial bodies” to “exclusively . . . peaceful
purposes.”14
While the creation of the U.S. Space Command and the USSF does not directly implicate
international law, it does raise questions about future U.S. activities in space and about the
compatibility of these activities with international law. General Mark A. Milley, chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that space is of strategic military importance because it sup-
plements combat operations on Earth, but it is also a “warfighting domain in and of itself.”15
6 Catie Edmondson, House Passes $738 Billion Military Bill with Space Force and Parental Leave, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 17, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/us/politics/house-ndaa-space-force-leave.html; 2020
NDAA, supra note 3, § 7602.
7 Donald J. Trump, Remarks on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 at Joint
Base Andrews, Maryland, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 885, at 3 (Dec. 20).
8 2020NDAA, supra note 3, § 952. The 2020NDAA passed in theHouse 377 to 48. 165 CONG. REC.H10092
(daily ed. Dec. 11, 2019) (Roll No. 672). In the Senate, it passed 86 to 8. 165 CONG. REC. S7070 (daily ed. Dec.
17, 2019) (Vote No. 400).
9 DOD Press Release, supra note 4; U.S. Space Force Press Release, U.S. Space Force Fact Sheet (Dec. 20,
2019), at https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheet [https://perma.cc/86MT-S5VW].
10 U.S. Space Force Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
11 Id.
12 Id.; see also 2020 NDAA, supra note 3, § 953 (establishing this position and defining its scope).
13 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Art. 3, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, 610 UNTS 205.
14 Id. Art. 4 (specifically proscribing the “establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the
testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies”).
15 DOD Press Release, supra note 4.
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The mission of the U.S. Space Command reflects Milley’s attitude—one of the U.S. Space
Command’s focus areas is that it “will improve the development of joint space operations
forces and capabilities to enhance space warfighting readiness and lethality while accelerating
the integration of space capabilities into other warfighting forces.”16 Similarly, the duties of
the USSF are to “deter aggression in, from, and to space” and “conduct space operations.”17
These developments contrast with recent actions taken at the United Nations, where five res-
olutions were adopted at the seventy-fourth session of the General Assembly addressing the
issue of the prevention of an outer space arms race.18
16 United States Space Command Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
17 NDAA 2020, supra note 3, § 952.
18 The five resolutions the General Assembly adopted were on “further practical measures for the prevention of
an arms race in outer space,” GA Res. 74/34 (Dec. 12, 2019); “international cooperation in the peaceful uses of
outer space,” GA Res. 74/82 (Dec. 12, 2019); “no first placement of weapons in outer space,” GA Res. 74/33
(Dec. 12, 2019); “prevention of an arms race in outer space,”GA Res. 74/32 (Dec. 12, 2019); and “transparency
and confidence-building measures in outer space activities,” GA Res. 74/67 (Dec. 12, 2019). The United States
voted against all of these resolutions except the one on international cooperation, which was adopted by consensus.
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